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BIASING BRANDS
Jeremy N. Sheff
ABSTRACT

The dominant search-costs model of trademark law posits that
consumers choose products to satisfy their preferences by analytically
mapping those preferences to product information that trademarks
efficiently provide. This Article tests these descriptive claims against
empirical and theoretical research in marketing and consumer
psychology, particularly the concept of "brandequity": the value to a
firm or its customers of a brand and of the firm's efforts to build and
maintain that brand.
Internally complex brandequity models,juxtaposed with empirical
findings in relatedpsychology and marketing research, challenge the
descriptive accuracyof the search-costs model. In particular,branding
efforts can influence consumer decision-making not only by informing
and persuading consumers, but also by altering the way consumers
evaluateproduct information and consumption experiences. In a word,
brandingcan bias consumers.
The phenomenon of brand bias suggests that the search-costs
model is incomplete and that trademark protection can only reliably
promote economic efficiency in a legal environment where
complementary regulations, such as those prevalent in food and drug
law, mitigate the opportunities for producers to extract rents by
manipulatingconsumer psychology. The Article concludes by situating
trademarklaw in this broaderweb of consumer protection law.

* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. This Article benefited
from comments at the 2009 Intellectual Property Scholars Roundtable (Drake Law School), the
9th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (Cardozo Law School), the Brooklyn Law
School Intellectual Property Colloquium, and the Faculty Colloquium at St. John's University
School of Law. Particular thanks for comments on earlier drafts from Professors Shahar Dillbary,
Dan Hunter, Paul Kirgis, Mark Lemley, Irina Manta, Jeff Sovern, Rebecca Tushnet, and Fred
Yen. All errors are the author's alone.
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Be thou familiar, but by no means vulgar;
Those friends thou hast, and their adoption tried,
Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel.
-William Shakespeare'
INTRODUCTION

In June of 2006, Miralus Healthcare launched a multi-million
dollar television advertising campaign. The company's ten-second
advertisement, 2 which ran repeatedly in syndicated programming, latenight television, and basic cable, 3 featured video of a young woman
rubbing Miralus's product-a glue-stick-like applicator-against her
forehead, while a female narrator urgently read the following script in
voiceover:
HeadOn: Apply directly to the forehead.
HeadOn: Apply directly to the forehead.
HeadOn: Apply directly to the forehead.
HeadOn is available without a prescription at retailers nationwide.
Obviously, this advertisement did not provide any information to
viewers as to the precise purpose or function of the HeadOn product.
Nor was that its intent. Miralus's marketing department had conducted
focus group testing of various advertisements and learned that
maximizing repetition led to the greatest consumer recall of the ad, and
as Dan Charron, Miralus's Vice President of Sales and Marketing
explained: "It's all about recall. It's all about recall." 4
This deliberately uninformative marketing strategy was likely
rendered even more attractive by the questionable properties of the
HeadOn product itself. Miralus intended to sell HeadOn as a topical
headache remedy, but the product contained only trace amounts of its
claimed effective ingredients, 5 none of which had been found in any

I WLLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act I, sc. 3.
2 Television Advertisement: Miralus Healthcare (June 2006), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-Is3icfcbmbs.
3 Theresa Howard, Headache Commercial Hits Parody Circuit, Well, HeadOn, USA
TODAY, July 31, 2006, at lB.
4 Mya Frazier, This Ad Will Give You a Headache,But It Sells: HeadOn Sales Are Up 234%
Even Though Its Spots Annoy Viewers, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 24, 2007, at 3. The printed
quotation does not indicate whether Mr. Charron intended any irony.
5 James Randi, Head On into Quackery (July 28, 2006), http://www.randi.org/jr/200607/072806academic.html#il5 (noting that the concentrations of effective ingredients in HeadOn
were one part per trillion and one part per million), cited in Randy A. Salas & Bill Ward, Hooey
or True-y?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Feb. 3, 2008, at lE.
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published study to alleviate headaches. 6 As a result, in March of 2006,
the National Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business
Bureaus cautioned Miralus against claiming that HeadOn provided
headache relief, under threat of referral to the Food and Drug
Administration. 7 Miralus's repetitive but uninformative ad campaign
followed soon thereafter.
The HeadOn ad was quickly derided in the national press as
"mind-numbing," 8 "bizarre," 9 and "the most annoying commercial on
television,"' 0 but Miralus's Charron was unapologetic: "We're just
trying to build a brand by getting people to remember it."" And people
did remember: While the ad spawned a host of parodies on late-night
comedy shows and the Internet,12 it also generated a huge boost in
Miralus's revenues. Sales of HeadOn grew by 234% from 2005 to
2006, and their torrid growth pace continued at least through the first six
months of 2007; meanwhile, spinoff products generated millions of
dollars in additional revenue for the company.' 3 Medical experts
argued consistently and repeatedly on the broadcast networks and in
major daily newspapers that any perceived headache relief delivered by
HeadOn was due to the placebo effect,14 but millions of tubes of the
6 Suz Redfearn, Head Rub, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/25/AR2006092500934.html.
7 Council of Better Bus. Bureaus, Nat'l Adver. Div., Miralus Healthcare, HeadOn@
HeadacheRelief Case # 4465 (Mar. 28, 2006); see also Consumer Union, HeadacheDrugLacks
Evidence, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 1, 2007, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/
health/prescription-drugs/headon-9-07/overview/0709_headache ov_1.htm; Ivan J. Wasserman,
Legal

Affairs:

Homeo-what-ic?,

ELECTRONIC

RETAILER

MAG.,

July

2006,

http://www.electronicretailermag.com/0706_1a.
8 Seth Stevenson, Head Case: The Mesmerizing Ad for Headache Gel, SLATE, July 24, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2146382.
9 Howard, supra note 3.
10 Nightly News (NBC television broadcast July 27, 2006), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-PybKYHP5r6O.
11 Frazier, supra note 4.
12 Id. ("Jay Leno has spoofed HeadOn on 'The Tonight Show' three times.... 'Saturday
Night Live' has referenced the ad, as has 'The Daily Show with Jon Stewart."'). Amateur
parodies are still available on YouTube. See, e.g., My Vision of the Head-on Ad, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-gv9NK7132hM (last visited Feb. 24, 2011); HeadOn Parody,
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKr80sT6Apl (last visited Feb. 24, 2011); Rock
On!, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-jLBrswljulY (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
13 Frazier, supra note 4 (recounting the sales history of HeadOn, and noting that Miralus's
follow-on product, ActivOn, had logged $5.5 million in sales). Despite this impressive growth
rate, it is unclear whether Miralus ever turned a profit. The company was still not profitable in
late 2007. See id. In any event, as of this writing Miralus remains in business, hawking HeadOn
and various spinoff homeopathic products such as RenewIn (a line of joint care and energy pills),
and PreferOn (a scar treatment cream).
Products, MIRALUS, http://www.miralus.com/
products.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).
14 See, e.g., Redfearn, supra note 6 (noting that the placebo effect occurs 30-40% of the time
with headache remedies); Brian Dakss, Doctor: 'Head On' No Headache Cure, Aug. 2, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/08/02/earlyshow/health/mainl859588.shtml; Does Hyped

2011]

BIASING BRANDS

1249

product were nevertheless purchased by consumers at prices between
five and eight dollars per unit.'I
The HeadOn example, in which a branded product objectively does
not perform its intended function, is marketed to the public by simply
repeating the brand name without disclosing the function of the
underlying product, and yet generates millions of dollars in revenues for
its manufacturer, represents more than the latest confirmation of a
phrase attributed to P.T. Barnum.16 It also has serious implications for
the legal regulation of consumer markets-and particularly for the
theoretical underpinnings of our system of trademark law. The project
of this Article is to analyze the features of consumer psychology and
behavior that make episodes like the HeadOn phenomenon possible,
and to discuss resulting challenges posed to conventional trademark law
theory.

For decades, trademark law theory has been dominated by the
economic analysis of the Chicago School. 17 Even those commentators
who offer a contrasting theoretical perspective admit that the influence
and acceptance of the Chicago School's approach is "nearly total" in
American trademark law.' 8 The economic justification for trademark
protection, as described in the models of Chicago School commentators,
is twofold. First, giving individual producers an exclusive right to
access the consumer goodwill that attaches to a particular word or
symbol is said to provide those producers with an incentive to produce
products of a high and consistent quality.' 9 This argument is over a

Headache
Remedy
'Head On'
Work?,
ABC
NEWS
(Dec.
2,
2006),
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=2695490.
15 Frazier, supra note 4 (noting that HeadOn generated $6.5 million in sales in 2006,
excluding sales at Wal-Mart, one of the product's biggest retailers); Stevenson, supra note 8
(noting that HeadOn was on sale at Wal-Mart for $5.24); Consumer Union, supra note 7 (stating
that HeadOn "costs about $8 in pharmacies").
16 ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST, There Is a Sucker Born Ev'ry Minute, on BARNUM (Sony

Records 2002) (1980) ("There is a sucker born ev'ry minute/Each time the second hand sweeps to
the top/Like dandelions up they pop,/Their ears so big, their eyes so wide./And though I feed 'em
bonafide baloney/With no truth in it/Why you can bet I'll find some rube to buy my com./'Cause
there's a sure-as-shooting sucker bom a minute/And I'm referrin' to the minute you were born.").
17 The definitive statement of this economic model of trademark law is William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & EcoN. 265 (1987). A

more theoretically rich, but less mathematically and doctrinally rigorous, treatment is Nicholas S.
Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523 (1988).
18 Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624

(2004).
19 Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 269-70.
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century old at least, 20 and whether or not it is persuasive, 21 it is not the
aim of the present Article to take it up.
Second-and more importantly for present purposes-it is argued
that trademark protection lowers consumer search costs, thereby
facilitating welfare-increasing transactions. Most products will have
some features or qualities that will be relevant to the consumer's
decision whether or not to purchase, but that cannot be measured
without either engaging in costly information gathering or, if this is not
possible, consuming the product. Because the seller who manufactured
the product typically has more information about such unobservable
product qualities than potential buyers have, it will be more efficient for
sellers to provide that information to buyers than for buyers to attempt
to seek out the information themselves-if buyers were even capable of
obtaining the information. Trademarks allow a convenient and efficient
means of executing this information transfer, allowing producers to
quickly and inexpensively convey a wealth of information about the
unobservable qualities of their products to consumers in order to inform
their decision whether or not to purchase. Because sellers can convey
this information through a trademark at a lower cost than the cost to
consumers of acquiring such information for themselves, trademarks are
said to lower consumer search costs-a type of transactions costthereby facilitating welfare-increasing voluntary transactions and
increasing aggregate social welfare. 22
The proposition that the function of trademarks is to inform
consumers is at the heart of the dominant theoretical model of
trademark law. In this view, the consumer's mind runs a kind of
matching algorithm, testing the consumer's own preferences against all
sources of information-whether derived from the consumer's own
search or from the informational content of a trademark-about the
available purchase options, in order to determine which purchase option
20 See, e.g., Emily Fogg-Meade, The Place of Advertising in Modern Business, 9 J. POL.

EcON. 218, 234 (1901) ("There is such a lack of co-operation and mutual confidence in the field
of consumption goods that the ordinary consumer has no redress against the adulteration of foods
and unsanitary goods except the inadequate force of legislation.... To a certain extent
advertising offers a remedy. In order to make the public familiar with goods, brands, stamps,
distinctive methods of wrapping and packing have been devised, by which the consumer will at
once recognize the advertised article.... The consumer obtains better goods in that he knows
what he is purchasing.").
21 See Glynn S. Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 440-62 (1999) (arguing
that the free-rider problem targeted by this justification for trademark protection is minor, and is
subject to countervailing concerns of abuse of market power).
22 Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 275-80 (outlining the formal economic model of
trademark protection, centered on the tradeoff between consumer search costs and the informative
content of trademarks, the cost of which is borne by producers). This argument actually provides
much of the foundation for the first argument in favor of trademark protection-that it
incentivizes the production of consistent, high-quality products.
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is most likely to satisfy his preferences. 23 And on its face, this second
justification for trademark protection is attractive. Producers will
obviously have better information about the qualities of their products
and services than prospective purchasers. Consumers will obviously
rely on information about those qualities in deciding whether to make a
purchase, and in deciding which product or service to select from a
range of options. As modem consumers, we can all think of numerous
examples of trademarks that bring to our minds particular information
about the attributes of the associated product that would be relevant to
our decision to make a purchase. Such information would be difficult
or impossible to obtain without consuming the product: the taste of a
soft drink, the reliability of a car, or the safety and efficacy of a drug. In
short, the search-costs rationale has great intuitive appeal.
The project of this Article is to question that intuition. Its subject
is the model of consumer decision-making underlying what I will refer
to as the "search-costs model" of trademarks. 24 Despite its intuitive
23 See Economides, supra note 17, at 525-26 (describing products as having both quality
features-of which all consumers desire the highest amount possible-and variety features-for
which different consumers might harbor different preferences depending on their subjective
tastes; and further describing the consumer's choice task as the selection of a product with the
most desirable features, whether those features are directly observable or must be inferred from
other information such as a trademark).
24 The term "search-costs model" is used advisedly, in part to reflect the fact that the
economic model of trademarks upon which current theory rests is somewhat outmoded in light of
developments in the Chicago School of economics research, as distinguished from the law-andeconomics program that first grew out of that body of study a generation ago. For example, the
prominent University of Chicago economist Gary S. Becker was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1992
in part for his work on human capital, a concept which he and others have deployed in order to
analyze choice behaviors that seem to reflect unstable individual preferences. Press Release,
Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of
Alfred Nobel 1992 (Oct. 13, 1992), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/
See generally GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR
economics/laureates/1992/press.html.
TASTES (1996) (collecting research by Becker and others on the concepts of personal and social
capital and their application to analysis of behavior, especially of choice). This work, among
other bodies of economic research in the Chicago School, was still quite new or even nonexistent
when the currently dominant economic models of trademark protection were originally
developed.
The increasing sophistication of economic tools that could be applied to trademark theory
has been noted by legal scholars, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the

Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1687-97 (1999), but very few legal scholars have
actually applied them. For a notable recent exception, see J. Shahar Dillbary, Famous
Trademarks and the Rational Basisfor Protecting "IrrationalBeliefs," 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.

605 (2007) (bringing contemporary economic analysis of brands and advertising to bear on the
question of the value of well-known trademarks).
This Article, unlike Dillbary's, is not intended to bring law-and-economics analysis of
trademarks up to speed with the current thinking of the economists who first formulated it (or
their disciples). Rather, this Article purports to apply a different body of extra-legal
scholarship-marketing and psychology research-to the dominant law-and-economics model as
it is typically invoked in discussions of the theory of trademark protection. This is not to say that
the Article ignores responses to its arguments that might be found in more current economic
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appeal, this model does not describe actual consumer decision-making
very well. It is unlikely that any modem consumer can, on reflection,
honestly characterize their myriad and varied purchasing decisions as a
series of calculations to determine likelihood of preference-satisfaction
based on a synthesis of product information conveyed by a trademark
with product information obtained independently. Many, if not most,
consumer transactions-from purchasing a pack of gum at a drugstore
checkout, to ordering a beer at a bar, to pre-ordering the latest tech
gadget online-are considerably less systematic and analytical than the
search-costs model can account for. Two questions therefore arise:
First, is a more descriptively accurate model of consumer decisionmaking available; and second, does that model, if it exists, provide the
same normative support for the current system of legal protection for
trademarks?
With respect to the first question, there is an entire field of
academic and professional study devoted to analyzing, predicting, and
influencing the consumer decision-making process: marketing. The
marketing literature has developed tools for analyzing consumer
decision-making, and particularly for analyzing the effect of trademarks
(and of the related construct, brands) on that decision-making. In
particular, marketing researchers have directed considerable attention to
the question of what makes consumers willing to pay more for a
branded product than for an equivalent unbranded product-the
question of "brand equity." Academic development of the concept of
brand equity has given rise to a model of consumer decision-making
that shares some overlap with the search-costs model, but also
contradicts it in important ways.
This Article proposes to identify these contradictions and discuss
their implications for the search-costs model's normative claims
regarding the legal protection of trademarks-the second question
identified above. Trademarks have multiple effects on consumers, each
of which has different normative implications. First, and consistent
with the search-costs model, trademarks inform consumers: They
provide consumers with objective information about the products and
services to which they are affixed. Second, trademarks persuade
consumers: Marketing efforts can generate or change consumer
preferences to align with whatever qualities-including subjective
research-quite the opposite. See, e.g., infra Parts II & III.B. 1. However, the project of this
Article is not to extend the dominance of trademark theory by Chicago School economic analysis,
but to critique that mode of analysis. As such, it is in keeping with the critical posture of other
recent forays into the marketing and consumer psychology literatures by trademark law
commentators. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modem Trademark Law's Theory ofHarm,

95 IOWA L. REv. 63 (2009); Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric DeRosia, Trademarks,
Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575 (2008).
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qualities-are perceived to be offered by a marked product. The
persuasive function of trademarks and advertising has long been a
subject of intense debate in the economic and legal academic literatures.
However, there are plausible arguments that the persuasive function of
trademarks can be incorporated into the search-costs model, and these
arguments do not lend themselves to empirical evaluation. That being
the case, this Article merely notes the existence of the debate without
attempting to resolve it.25
Rather, this Article will focus on a third, under-appreciated effect
of trademarks: their ability to bias consumers. By "bias," I mean that
trademarks, supported by marketing activities (a combination this
Article will refer to as a "brand" 26 ), can give rise to consumer beliefs
about objective product qualities that are objectively mistaken, and yet
resistant to correction by exposure of the consumer to objective
evidence. I refer to this phenomenon as "brand bias," and I situate it as
an example of the type of boundedly rational decision-making behavior
that undergirds the behavioralist critique of neoclassical law and
economics models (such as the search-costs model).
The behavioralist critique does not so much invalidate traditional
economic models of behavior (such as the search-costs model) as it
requires their qualification. Specifically, it raises the possibility that
strategic actors can compromise the efficiencies of a system (such as the
trademark system) by manipulating the divergence between rational and
boundedly rational behavior. As the Miralus example above illustrates,
and as the rest of this Article will further show, marketing techniques
can be and are in fact deployed strategically by brand owners to
manipulate brand bias in welfare-reducing ways. Moreover, this

25 See infra Part IIA; cf Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103

MICH. L. REV. 2020 (2005) (exploring the shifting reliance on informative and persuasive
functions of trademarks in discourse about the proper scope of trademark law).
26 It should be noted that this definition of "brand" is not necessarily coextensive with the
legal concept of a "trademark," nor with the various definitions of "brand" extant in the
marketing literature. Some marketing studies present definitions of "brand" that strongly
resemble the legal definition of a trademark. Compare, e.g., DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING
BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME 7 (1991) ("A brand is a

distinguishing name and/or symbol (such as a logo, trademark, or package design) intended to
identify the goods or services of either one seller or a group of sellers, and to differentiate those
goods or services from those of competitors."), with Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2009)
("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof
. . . used by a person ... to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods ....

). However, many marketing

discussions of brands define the concept broadly to include consumers' mental images and
emotional associations with the identifier itself, the mix of marketing activities (including
pricing) deployed to support the identifier, or other more nebulous concepts. Lisa Wood, Brands
and Brand Equity: Definition and Management, 38 MGMT. DECISION 662, 664-65 (2000).
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strategic behavior is enabled by the very trademark protection that the
search-costs model purports to justify in the name of efficiency.
For this reason, trademark law may, in some circumstances,
demand support from complementary legal regimes-consumer
protection regimes-in order to minimize the ability of strategic actors
(like Miralus in the example above) to compromise the efficiencies of
the trademark system. Whether such legal intervention is desirable
depends on a comparison of the costs of strategic manipulation of brand
bias with the costs of the intervention in question. To a considerable
extent, such consumer protection regimes already exist. This Article
will focus on one prominent example-food and drug law-as an
illustration of the types of interventions available and as a tool to
explore the dynamics of the relationship between trademark law and
consumer protection law.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I will describe the searchcosts model of trademark protection and the marketing concept of brand
equity. Part II will draw out distinctions in the descriptive claims of
each model, informed by related research in economics, marketing, and
psychology. The resulting analysis suggests that the search-costs model
is descriptively inaccurate, or at least incomplete, and that the biasing
power of brands requires qualification of the model's normative claims
(particularly the claim that our system of trademark protection
categorically increases social welfare). Finally, Part III identifies the
key policy implications of these descriptive improvements on the
search-costs model-that trademark protection demands, and has in fact
generated, complementary regulation to prevent producers from using
the powerful tool they have in trademark rights to extract rents by
manipulating consumer psychology-and illustrates this point with
examples from food and drug law. The Article concludes by discussing
the normative implications of this reorientation of trademark law theory.
I. SEARCH COSTS AND BRAND EQUITY
A.

Unpacking "Search Costs"

A classic statement of the search-costs rationale for trademark
protection was offered two decades ago by Professor Nicholas
Economides:
From an economic standpoint, the argument for trademarks is
simple. In many markets, sellers have much better information as to
the unobservable features of a commodity for sale than the buyers.
This is known as information asymmetry. Unobservable features,
valued by the consumer, may be crucial determinants of the total
value of the good .. ..

[I]f there is a way to identify the
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unobservable qualities, the consumer's choice becomes clear. . . .
The economic role of the trademark is to help the consumer identify
the unobservable features of the trademarked product.
This
information is not provided to the consumer in an analytic form, such
as an indication of size or a listing of ingredients, but rather in
summary form, through a symbol which the consumer identifies with
a specific combination of features. Information in analytic form is a
complement to, rather than a substitute for, trademarks. 27
Of course, as noted in Landes & Posner's seminal paper on the
economics of trademark law, "[t]o perform its economizing function a
trademark .. . must not be duplicated," and therefore "the benefits of
trademarks in lowering consumer search costs presuppose legal
protection of trademarks." 28 Where such protection is present, we
expect that producers will assume the costs of disseminating
information about the unobservable qualities of their products through
promotion of their trademarks, with the understanding that consumers
will associate that information with the products bearing the producer's
trademark, and the investment in promoting those trademarks will thus
redound to the producer's benefit. In this way, information about the
unobservable qualities of products will be made available to consumers
at a lower cost than if the consumers were compelled to seek out that
information for themselves every time they wished to make a purchase.
This shift of information costs from a party with a higher cost
structure (consumers) to a party with a lower cost structure (producers)
promotes economic efficiency and thereby facilitates welfare-increasing
transactions. To illustrate with an example, 29 consider the market for
soft drinks. A particular consumer may be willing to pay as much as
three dollars30 for a soft drink with a particular flavor, and a particular
manufacturer may be willing to manufacture and sell a soft drink with
that flavor for two dollars. If all parties had perfect information about
the qualities of the manufacturer's product, we would expect our
hypothetical consumer and manufacturer to be able to strike a bargain to
exchange the beverage for between two and three dollars-leaving

27 Economides, supranote 17, at 526-27.
28 Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 269, 270.
29 This example assumes a basic familiarity with the application of the tools of welfare
economics to the analysis of legal problems. An overview of the approach can be found in Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 961, 977-99 (2001).

30 Dollars are used here as a convenient unit of measure for the more complex (and
theoretically broader) welfare-economics concept of "utility." Id. at 979-80 (defining utility as a
measure of well-being that "incorporates in a positive way everything that an individual might
value-goods and services that the individual can consume, social and environmental amenities,
personally held notions of fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others, and so forth ... [, and]
reflects in a negative way harms to his or her person and property, costs and inconveniences, and
anything else that the individual might find distasteful").
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neither of them worse off and one or both of them better off than before.
Assuming perfect competition with free entry among manufacturers,
and further assuming our manufacturer is at no comparative advantage
or disadvantage to other manufacturers in producing soft drinks with the
desired flavor, we would expect our manufacturer to sell the beverage to
our consumer for the manufacturer's reserve price of two dollars.31
Comparing the state of the parties before and after the transaction, we
can see that the consumer has moved from having two dollars in cash to
having a beverage she values at three dollars, while the manufacturer
has moved from having a beverage representing two dollars of value to
having two dollars in cash. On an aggregate basis, then, our buyer and
seller have moved from having the equivalent of four dollars to having
the equivalent of five dollars-a net social benefit of one dollar. The
transaction has therefore increased social welfare.
But now suppose that the consumer lacks information about the
flavor of the various soft drinks available to her for purchase, and that in
order to determine whether a particular soft drink has the desired flavor
she would have to engage in a search for information about her various
purchase options-either by purchasing samples, or seeking out persons
with specialized knowledge of the manufacture and retail sale of soft
drinks, or through some other means-at a cost to the consumer of two
dollars.32 Given these costs to the consumer of determining whether
our manufacturer's soft drink will be satisfactory, the total cost of that
soft drink to the consumer will be at least four dollars (two dollars in
search costs plus the manufacturer's two dollar reserve price). Of
course, this total cost exceeds the consumer's subjective valuation of the
soft drink (three dollars), and she will therefore be unwilling to
purchase the manufacturer's product. Thus, where search costs are
high, transactions that would otherwise be welfare-increasing will not
take place, leaving society worse off than it would be in the absence of
search costs.
Next, let us suppose that instead of the consumer engaging in her
own search to determine whether a particular soft drink is likely to
satisfy her flavor preferences, the manufacturer launches an advertising
31 Because of our assumption of perfect competition, we would expect the manufacturer's
reserve price to be equivalent to the marginal cost of the last-produced unit of the beverage, such
cost to include a reasonable return to the producer.
32 Of course, if the consumer is unable to gather relevant information about the product
without consuming it, then multiplying the cost of the product by the probability that it will fail to
satisfy the consumer's preferences would be a plausible way to express the consumer's search
costs. See id. at 979 & n.33 (describing the calculation of "expected utility" in welfare economics
analysis of decision-making in conditions of uncertainty). Given more than one or two purchase
options and a more than trivial probability of dissatisfaction with any one option, this measure of
search costs could be expected to easily exceed the consumer's subjective valuation of a
satisfactory product.
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campaign to inform the public of the flavor characteristics of soft drinks
sold under the manufacturer's brand name-for argument's sake,
assume the brand name is "COCA-COLA." Suppose further that the
cost of this advertising campaign, combined with the cost of labeling
the manufacturer's products with the COCA-COLA trademark, works
out to fifty cents per unit. Now, assuming the consumer has seen the
advertisements and remembers them, she need not engage in her own
costly search to determine whether a particular soft drink will satisfy her
flavor preference. So long as the law ensures that the COCA-COLA
trademark is applied only to this particular manufacturer's products, the
consumer can rely on the information conveyed to her by that trademark
(through her memory of the associated advertising campaign) when she
encounters it on a particular product for sale. Of course, the
manufacturer will now have a higher reserve price of $2.50 (to recover
the increased cost of its marketing efforts), but this is still less than the
consumer's valuation of the product ($3.00), and therefore a welfareincreasing bargain can still be struck. Thus, by shifting the burden of
informing the consumer about the flavor characteristics of the soft drink
from the consumer (who has relatively high search costs) to the
producer (who, on a per-unit basis, has relatively lower marketing
costs), trademarks facilitate welfare-increasing transactions and thereby
increase aggregate social welfare. 33
This soft drink example offers a pat explanation for a common
feature of consumer markets: the brand premium. Note that our
manufacturer's reserve price for the product absent a supporting
marketing effort is lower than its reserve price for a physically
equivalent branded product, due to the increased cost of producing and
marketing the latter product. As discussed further below, typically
branded products sell at some premium over equivalent unbranded
products. 34 While on its face, a price disparity among products that are
physically identical might suggest an inefficient market, the searchcosts model provides a handy explanation for the disparity. Under the
33 Obviously this specific example can be expanded to account for various types of product
information and various means of generating that information. Instead of flavor information, a
trademark could serve to convey information to consumers about other objective product
characteristics-price, color, texture, durability, composition, etc-or subjective
characteristics-value, stylishness, social cachet, trendiness, luxury, etc. Moreover, this
information need not be implanted in the consumer's memory by advertising; a consumer's
memory of the attributes of products bearing a particular trademark could just as easily be based
on past personal experience with products bearing the mark; word-of-mouth or recommendations
from family, friends, or acquaintances; professional independent reviews and publications;
Internet crowd-sourced review sites and message boards; and the like. However, the advertising
mechanism is of special interest for purposes of this Article for reasons that will become apparent
below.
34 See infra Part I.B.
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assumptions set forth in our example, we can understand this premium
for the branded product as nothing more than a pass-through of
marketing costs from the manufacturer to the consumer. This passthrough of marketing costs should not alter the model's conclusion that
trademark protection increases aggregate social welfare-quite the
opposite. In the context of our soft drink example, the consumer is
essentially paying the manufacturer fifty cents for information that
would otherwise have cost her two dollars to obtain on her own. Absent
the ability to pass this cost on to the consumer, our manufacturer would
not be willing to complete the transaction at the price it would have
been willing to accept for an equivalent product unsupported by
marketing activities, because after subtracting out the costs of such
activities it would incur a loss of fifty cents on the sale. Thus, the brand
premium, under the search-costs model, represents the portion of
information costs borne by the manufacturer but passed on to the
consumer as part of the purchase price.35
This last feature of the search-costs model warrants serious
scrutiny. The model implies that any brand premium should be
understood to represent the information value of the manufacturer's

35 The search-costs model explains disparities in brand premia within a single product market
as reflective of the quantum of information conveyed by a mark: the "stronger" a mark is, the
more information it conveys, and therefore the more the consumer will be willing to pay the
producer for a product bearing the mark. Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 277-79. This
explanation will be scrutinized in Part II, infra, but a brief discussion is warranted here.
Assuming perfect competition among manufacturers, we would expect the maximum brand
premium in any given market to approach the cost to the most efficient marketer of disseminating
all the information needed for the marginal consumer to make her purchase decision-with the
supramarginal consumer either foregoing the purchase or gathering additional information on her
own. As such, under the assumption of perfect competition, the search-costs model implies that
the optimal level of product information will be supplied at the lowest possible cost to society.
Cf Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 278-79 ("Firms with strong trademarks ... will command
higher prices for their brands not because of any market power but because the search costs
associated with their brand are lower.").
Where a manufacturer enjoys market power, in contrast, we would expect the brand
premium charged by that manufacturer to approach the cost to the marginal consumer of
acquiring on her own the information conveyed by the trademark. This would not necessarily
result in any welfare losses beyond the deadweight losses typically associated with the supracompetitive prices charged by a firm with market power; it could merely represent a transfer of
surplus value from the consumer to the producer. Although the search-costs model essentially
dismisses this feature of the monopoly case as of little relevance, see id. at 274-75, 277 & n.26,
others have warned strongly about its potential for abuse through producer actions (such as
persuasive advertising) that seek to create market power through branding. See generally
Lunney, supra note 21. A similar argument features in the present discussion, but at a more
fundamental level. The question posed in this Article is not whether the proportion of a brand's
value attributable to the brand's persuasive effects is best understood as created or transferred, but
rather whether a model of consumer decision-making that characterizes information-whether
objective or subjective-as the source of that value is descriptively accurate. See infra Part II.
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This conclusion assumes a number of empirical
trademark.36
propositions about the nature of consumer decision-making, without
reference to any actual empirical evidence. In essence, the model posits
that the reason consumers will pay more for branded Product A than for
the equivalent unbranded Product B is that the trademark on Product A
conveys information that the consumer will evaluate against her
preferences. In the absence of the trademark (as will be the case for
Product B), she would have to obtain such information independently,
leading her to value the two products differently. These empirical
claims will be the focus of the remainder of this Article. As will
become clear, the marketing and psychology literatures have arrived at
somewhat different conclusions concerning the nature of consumer
decision-making than those offered by the economic analysis
underlying the search-costs model. The descriptive differences between
these approaches imply different normative conclusions concerning the
brand premium and, by extension, the system of trademark protection.
B.

BrandEquity: An Alternative Model

While law and economics theorists have constructed an elegant
model to explain why seemingly equivalent products might be priced
differently based on nothing more than their trademark, the marketing
literature has attempted to generate some empirical data on the question
in the hopes of developing tools for managers to enhance firm
performance. In this pursuit, marketing researchers have developed the
concept of "brand equity." An early discussion of brand equity explains
the concept as follows:
We define brand equity as the "added value" with which a given
brand endows a product. A product is something that offers a
functional benefit (e.g., a toothpaste, a life insurance policy, or a
car). A brand is a name, symbol, design, or mark that enhances the
value of a product beyond its functional purpose. Depending on
which perspective is considered, the brand can have added value to
the firm, the trade, or the consumer.37
This seemingly simple definition incorporates a number of concepts,
which must be parsed for the present analysis.
36 This is not to deny that one product might sell at a premium to a competing product due to
its superior qualities and that those qualities might be communicated to consumers through a
trademark. Rather, the brand premium as conceptualized here reflects the difference in price
between two identical products-one supported by an information-bearing trademark and one
without any trademark.
37 Peter H. Farquhar, Managing Brand Equity, 1 MARKETING REs. 24, 24-25 (1989) (internal
citations omitted).
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First, the construct of brand equity posits that the value of a
branded product can be divided into two components: the value of the
functionality of the product, and the value of the brand. One way of
conceptualizing brand equity, then, is as the total value of a branded
product less the value of an equivalent, unbranded product. 38 It should
be clear that this conception of brand equity in the marketing literature
is not inconsistent with the search-costs model, in which the brand
premium represents the value of the information conveyed by a
trademark, as distinct from the value of the underlying product.
Second, brand equity can be conceptualized from the perspective
of either the firm that owns the brand or the consumer who encounters it
in the marketplace. 39 The adoption of one perspective or another will
usually depend on the purpose of the analysis. Examining firm-based
brand equity can be useful in calculating the value of a brand as an
intangible asset for purposes of financial reporting, tracking the impact
of marketing changes on firm performance, or analyzing major
transactions such as mergers and acquisitions. 40 Examining consumer38 See Benjamin Kartono & Vithala R. Rao, Brand Equity Measurement: A Comparative
Review and a Normative Guide 23 (Dec. 28, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1401149 ("Brand equity is the incremental value that a brand name
endows upon a product as a result of the firm's marketing efforts, and this value can be viewed
from the perspective of the consumer or the firm."). While this definition of brand equity is
typical, the literature is not monolithic. For a list of definitions of brand equity in the marketing
literature, see KEVIN LANE KELLER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING,

AND MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 43 figs. 1-12 (2d ed. 2003). A discussion of some of these
definitions and the differences between them can be found in Wood, supra note 26, at 662-63.
Beyond its effect on the value of a branded product, marketers generally acknowledge that
brand equity can also give the brand owner additional competitive advantages that are not
captured by this definition. These could include, for example, the ability to license or extend a
brand into new markets, increased bargaining power over firms in the distribution channel, and
decreased prospective marketing costs arising from consumers' baseline awareness of the brand.
Kartono & Rao, supra, at I (citing PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT: MILLENIUM
EDITION (2000)). As such, brand equity can be conceived of as a form of capital, though a full
discussion of this aspect of brand equity is not of primary importance to the present discussion.
Cf Landes & Posner,supra note 17, at 277 ("A more elaborate model would explicitly consider
trademarks as a part of the firm's capital and [the cost of producing information to be associated
with a trademark] as gross investment in that capital."). Indeed, insofar as a more complete
model would imply that producers who have already built up capital in the form of brand equity
will face lower prospective costs of capturing the types of economic rents discussed infra in Part
III, such a broader analysis would likely only strengthen the conclusions drawn herein.
39 The reference in Farquhar, supra note 37, to the value of a brand to "the trade" simply
refers to the situation in which a brand may have value to an intermediary in the distribution
chain; i.e., a purchaser who is not the ultimate consumer. A recent addition to the literature also
proposes to assess brand equity from the employee perspective, in order to better account for the
contributions of employee interactions with customers to brand equity. See generally Ceridwyn
King & Debra Grace, Employee Based Brand Equity: A Third Perspective, 30 SERVICES
MARKETING Q. 122 (2009).
40 Kevin Lane Keller, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer-Based Brand
Equity, 57 J. MARKETING 1, 1 (1993) ("There have been two general motivations for studying
brand equity. One is a financially based motivation to estimate the value of a brand more
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based brand equity, in contrast, is helpful in identifying mechanisms by
which consumers attribute higher value to a branded than to an
unbranded product, so as to better assess consumer responses to
marketing activities and better target those activities to maximize the
value of the brand to its owner. 4 1 Of course, there is a strong
relationship between firm-based and consumer-based brand equity, the
former largely representing an aggregation of the latter. 42
Third, this purposive selection of perspectives also extends to the
methodological tools of brand equity analysis. Some research focuses
strictly on identifying the economic or financial value of a brand; some
focuses on the psychological or behavioral response of consumers to a
brand. Although either approach can be found in both firm-based and
consumer-based analyses, unsurprisingly psychological approaches tend
to dominate in studies of consumer-based brand equity, while financial
and economic approaches tend to be more common in studies of firmbased brand equity. Moreover, psychological analyses tend to be
qualitative in nature, 43 while economic and financial analyses
unsurprisingly tend to be quantitative.
precisely for accounting purposes (in terms of asset valuation for the balance sheet) or for merger,
acquisition, or divestiture purposes."). See generally Vijay Mahajan, Vithala R. Rao & Rajendra
K. Srivastava, An Approach to Assess the Importance ofBrand Equity in Acquisition Decisions,

11 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 221 (1994) (proposing a methodology for assessing firmbased brand equity for the purpose of evaluating potential merger transactions); Carol J. Simon &
Mary W. Sullivan, The Measurement and Determinantsof Brand Equity: A FinancialApproach,

12 MARKETING SCI. 28 (1993) (proposing a method to measure firm-based brand equity in order
to assess the determinants of the brand's value and the effect of marketing changes on firm
performance).
41 AAKER, supra note 26, at 32 (describing the objectives of the author's investigation of
brand equity, including "help[ing] managers see more clearly how brand equity provides value
... [and] to discuss how brand equity should be . .. created, maintained, and protected");

KELLER, supra note 38, at 1-2 ("A second reason for studying brand equity arises from a strategy[M]arketers need a more thorough
based motivation to improve marketing productivity ....
understanding of consumer behavior as a basis for making better strategic decisions about target
market definition and product positioning, as well as better tactical decisions about specific
marketing mix actions.").
42 Simon & Sullivan, supra note 40, at 29 & n.2 (defining brand equity from the firm
perspective as "the incremental cash flows which accrue to branded products over and above the
cash flows which would result from the sale of unbranded products" and noting that "[t]he
incremental cash flows are based on the value consumers place on branded products and on cost
savings brand equity generates through competitive advantages"); see also Benjamin Kartono &
Vithala R. Rao, Linking Consumer-Based Brand Equity to Market Performance: An Integrated
Approach to Brand Equity Management (Nov. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.zibs.comr/techreports/Linking%20CBE%20Market%20Performance.pdf
(developing
and testing an econometric model to capture the correlation between consumer-based brand
equity and firm-based brand equity); V. Srinivasan, Chan Su Park & Dae Ryun Chang, An
Approach to the Measurement, Analysis, and Prediction of Brand Equity and Its Sources, 51

MGMT. SCI. 1433 (2005) (proposing a model to link disaggregated consumer-level measurement
of brand equity with aggregate financial firm-based measures).
43 By "qualitative" I do not mean to suggest that such research is not empirical. As discussed
infra in Part II.D, much of the psychology-informed literature on brand equity is empirical,
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Qualitative, Psychology-Based Brand Equity Analysis

Much early brand equity research was qualitative in nature,
seeking to conceptualize the various elements of consumer psychology
and behavior that allow a brand to acquire and retain value. Perhaps the
seminal work in this regard is David Aaker's Managing Brand Equity,
an exposition of brand equity designed to assist managers in
maximizing the value of their brands. 44 "Since its inception, Aaker's
brand equity model has been broadly accepted and employed by many
researchers." 45 Aaker breaks down brand equity into five elements, the
first four of which represent features of consumer psychology:
Brand Awareness.46 Aaker defines brand awareness as "the ability
of a potential buyer to recognize or recall that a brand is a member of a
certain product category," and distinguishes between three levels of
brand awareness: brand recognition (the ability to identify a brand that
one has heard of before when provided a list of brands in a product
class), brandrecall (the ability to provide a brand name when asked to
name brands in a product class), and top-of-mind awareness (the status
ascribed to the first brand a consumer names for a given product
category). 47
Brand Associations.48 This construct encompasses "anything
'linked' in memory to a brand." 49 This could include such disparate
associations as the physical qualities of a product sold under the brand,
intangible associations such as brand symbols or market segments,
abstract and subjective concepts such as emotions or personality and
lifestyle images evoked by the brand, or personal associations such as
memories of using the branded product or service.50 The total network
of brand associations is labeled brandimage in Aaker's framework, and
a brand's image relative to its universe of competitors constitutes its
brand position, a key function of which is to differentiate the brand
from others so as to insulate it from competition. 5 '

although some of it admittedly cannot be fairly characterized that way. See infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
44 AAKER, supra note 26.

45 Kartono & Rao, supra note 38, at 10.
46 AAKER, supra note 26, at 19, 56-77.

47 Id. at 61-62; accord Keller, supra note 40, at 12 (discussing tools for measuring the various
levels of brand awareness).
48 AAKER, supra note 26, at 20-21, 104-80.
49 Id at 109.
50 Id.

51 Id. at 109-12.
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Perceived Quality.52 This construct "can be defined as the
customer's perception of the overall quality or superiority of a product
or service with respect to its intended purpose, relative to
alternatives." 53 It is, in essence, a particular kind of brand association, 54
but is notable for its emphasis on subjective quality assessments by
consumers rather than objective measures of product quality. This
distinction is due in part to the varied tastes and needs of consumers,
and in part to the possibility that subjective assessments of quality may
be inconsistent with objective measurements of quality but still guide
consumer choices.55
Brand Loyalty. 56 Brand loyalty is defined as "a measure of the
attachment that a customer has to a brand. It reflects how likely a
customer will be to switch to another brand, especially when that brand
makes a change, either in price or in product features."57
Other ProprietaryBrandAssets.58 This element of brand equity is
something of a catch-all for contributors to brand value that do not
depend on consumer responses to the brand. Examples might include
intellectual property rights (such as trademark rights in brand symbols
or patents on an underlying product) and distributorship relationships
that "inhibit or prevent competitors from eroding a customer base and
loyalty." 59
Qualitative brand equity research after Aaker tends to conflate
some of his categories, parse them into finer categories, or supplement
them with firm-based constructs. 60
52 Id. at 19, 78-103.
53 Id. at 85.

54 Compare id. at 87 (noting that perceived quality is a key element of the brand's positioning
and differentiation from other brands), with discussion, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55 AAKER, supra note 26, at 85 (noting that perceived quality differs from actual or objective
quality, partly because it is defined in terms of perception, and partly because even purportedly
objective quality measures must make value judgments about the relative importance of attributes
or features, and those judgments may not coincide with the priorities of all consumers).
56 Id. at 19, 34-55.
57 Id. at 39.
58 Id. at 21.
59 Id

60 Aaker himself subsequently expanded his list of brand equity elements to incorporate firmbased measures such as market share, price, and distribution networks. DAVID AAKER, BUILDING
STRONG BRANDS (1996). Kevin Lane Keller, the first marketing researcher to posit consumerbased brand equity as a discrete construct, has proposed even more elaborate models of the
concept. In one early article, Keller divides brand associations into three subcategories: brand
attributes--comprising either physical features of the product or non-product-related attributes
such as "images" and "personality attributes" associated with the brand-brand benefitsconsumer beliefs about what the product can do for them-and brand attitudes-overall positive
or negative evaluations of a brand. Keller, supra note 40, at 3-8. Keller's early model combined
this more structured view of brand associations with the separate concept of brand awareness
(itself divided into brand recall and brand recognition) into a single construct defined as "brand
knowledge." Id. at 2-8. Keller later revised his consumer-based brand equity model to reflect a
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Quantitative, Finance-Based Brand Equity Analysis

Early efforts to take quantitative measurements of brand equity
generally aimed at the firm level. "Brand equity research from a firm's
perspective typically assesses brand performance in terms of earningsrelated measures like revenue, market share, and price premium." 6 1
Despite various alternatives in the extant literature, "[t]here is presently
no standard methodology for [firm-level] financial brand valuation, and
firms rely on their own in-house estimation methods or various methods

hierarchical and cumulative construction of the brand's value in the mind of the consumer: brand
awareness leads to brand associations, which then generate brand attitudes, which in turn lead to
brand attachment (a measure of brand loyalty that accounts for the strength of the consumer's
devotion to the brand), and ultimately to "brand activity": a measure of the ways consumers use
the brand out in the world, by either talking about it, using the products and services associated
with it, or seeking it out. KELLER, supra note 38, at 392-93. For a more detailed discussion of
Keller's revised customer-based brand equity framework, see id at 59-103.
In a similar vein, a recent study by Girish Punj and Clayton Hillyer purports to evaluate,
through analysis of consumer surveys, the relationships between various components of brand
equity and to establish that each plays a role in the cognitive processes of consumers facing
purchase decisions. Girish N. Punj & Clayton L. Hillyer, A Cognitive Model of Customer-Based
Brand Equity for Frequently Purchased Products: Conceptual Framework and Empirical
Results, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 124 (2004).

61 Kartono & Rao, supranote 38, at 28. An early example developed by the consultancy firm
the Interbrand Group attempts to predict future revenues attributable to a brand's value by
formulating a brand-earnings multiplier from various subjective measures of brand strength and
then applying the multiplier to historical earnings. See Laurel Wentz & Geoffrey Martin, How
Experts Value Brands, ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 16, 1989, at 24; see also Jeffrey A Dubin, The
Demandfor Branded and UnbrandedProducts: An Econometric Methodfor Valuing Intangible
Assets, in STUDIES IN CONSUMER DEMAND: ECONOMETRIC METHODS APPLIED TO MARKET

DATA, ch. 4 (1998) (elaborating a similar method in an econometric model). Other revenuebased measures have been derived from comparing prices of products bearing the brand in
question to similar private label products (i.e., store or house brands). E.g., Kusum L. Ailawadi,
Donald R. Lehmann, & Scott A. Neslin, Revenue Premium as an Outcome Measure of Brand

Equity, 67 J. MARKETING 1 (2003). Another method seeks to derive the brand's value to the firm
by extrapolating from the firm's total market capitalization, subtracting out the value of tangible
assets and adjusting for various firm- and industry-specific factors that correlate to intangible
assets other than the brand. Simon & Sullivan, supra note 40, at 31-41. This method is derived
from a mainstay of financial analysis: Tobin's Q, defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm
to the replacement cost of the firm's tangible assets. Id. at 32 (citing James Tobin, A General
Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1969)); James
Tobin, Monetary Policies and the Economy: The Transmission Mechanism, 37 S. ECON. J. 421-

31 (1978). Yet another method defines the brand's value in terms of its replacement cost-that
is, the cost in marketing expenditures of establishing the brand discounted by the probability that
an attempt to establish the brand from scratch would fail. Simon & Sullivan, supra note 40, at 30
("The. . . technique estimates brand replacement cost, the cost of establishing a product with a
new brand name. For example, if it costs $100 million to launch a new product and the
probability of success is 25%, then the expected cost of establishing a comparable brand name is
$400 million.").
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provided by consultants to estimate this value." 62 Fortunately for
present purposes, analysis of brand value at the firm level sheds little if
any light on the search-costs model of trademark law, and so the lack of
consensus on the issue should not complicate assessment of that model.
Another, newer stream of research seeks to measure brand equity
quantitatively from the consumer point of view-a far more useful
approach for present purposes. This literature typically seeks to
quantify brand equity as the economic value assigned by consumers to a
branded product less the economic value of the objective attributes of
the product. Such values are derived from various data sources, such as
consumer surveys;63 Nielsen data on consumer product barcode
scanning, demographic information, and advertising exposures; 64 or
controlled experiments designed to simulate relevant aspects of the
marketplace. 65 As with firm-based measures, some researchers
attempting to isolate the portion of consumer utility attributable to the
brand itself (as opposed to the objective qualities of the underlying
product) compare consumer responses to branded products with their
responses to private labels or store brands. 66 These studies generate
results that can be expressed in dollar amounts; in utilities; or in ratios
that express the value of a studied brand relative either to another
studied brand, to a private label, or to a hypothetical unbranded product
with similar objective qualities.
3.

Bridging the Gap: Quantitative Research Tying the
Sources of Brand Equity (Consumer Psychology) to
Its Outcomes (Economic Performance)

For purposes of the present Article, it should be apparent that
neither the qualitative research discussed in Part I.B. 1, nor the
quantitative research discussed in Part I.B.2, are sufficient to provide an
empirical test of the search-costs model. The qualitative research
provides insight into how consumers make decisions with respect to
62 Kartono & Rao, supra note 38, at 24; see also Dubin, supra note 61, at 79-85 (describing
various approaches to measuring brand equity, both at the firm level and at the consumer level).
63 Compare Raj Sethuraman, Measuring National Brands' Equity over Store Brands, 1 REV.
MARKETING SCI., art. 2 (2003), available at http://www.bepress.com/romsjournal/voll/issl/art2,
with Ailawadi et al., supra note 61.
64 Wagner A. Kamakura & Gary J. Russell, Measuring Brand Value with Scanner Data, 10
INT'L J. RES. MARKETING 9 (1993).
65 Joffre Swait et al., The Equalization Price: A Measure of Consumer-Perceived Brand

Equity, 10 INT'L J. RES. MARKETING 23 (1993). Unlike other studies discussed in this subpart,
this study does not attempt to control for objective product attributes but rather incorporates them
into the measurement of consumer utility targeted by the model and tested by the experiment.
66 Sethuraman, supra note 63.
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branded products, but provides no information about the economic
effects of those consumer decision-making processes. Conversely, the
quantitative research can provide quantification of the value of brands
relative to unbranded products or relative to one another, but does not
directly address the features of consumer decision-making that result in
that differential valuation. As discussed above, 67 the search-costs
model posits not only that a branded product will sell at a premium to
an equivalent unbranded product (or to an equivalent product bearing a
"weaker" brand), but that the reason for that premium is that the brand
conveys valuable information about the product that consumers would
have to expend greater resources searching for in the absence of the
brand.
Although neither stream of brand equity research alone is sufficient
to test these positive claims of the search-costs model, some recent
studies have been attempting to seal the breach by tying the qualitative
constructs of psychology-informed brand equity models to the
quantitative results of economics-informed brand equity research.
These studies attempt to parse out the portion of the economic value of
the brand attributable to each of the various psychological constructs of
qualitative brand equity models. One early example found a correlation
between the consumer psychology construct of brand attitude (an
overall reaction to a brand as "good" or "bad") and stock market returns
in the computer industry. 68 Another more recent study constructed an
econometric model of the relationship between two constructs of
consumer-based brand equity-perceived quality and customer
satisfaction (a proxy for brand loyalty)-in the auto industry, relying on
commercial consumer ratings data and reported financial and
accounting results to extrapolate the effects of each construct on firm
market outcomes such as market share and elasticity of demand. 69 The
results of the study imply that in the auto industry, perceived quality
correlates with greater increases in firm revenue and in the firm's
revenue premium than does satisfaction. 70
Recently, two groups of authors conducted studies to directly
investigate the relationship between the components of consumer-based
brand equity and outcome measures of firm-based brand equity. The
first study conducted a survey of business travelers to elicit their views
of various luxury hotel chains in order to gather data on the content and
strength of each of David Aaker's original psychological constructs of
67 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
68 David A. Aaker & Robert Jacobson, The Value Relevance of Brand Attitude in HighTechnology Markets, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 485 (2001). On the relationship between "brand

attitude" and the elements of brand equity discussed above, see id. at 486 n.3.
69 Kartono & Rao, supra note 42, at 27-32.
70 Id. at 32 & tbl.8.
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brand equity.' The authors then attempted to find correlations between
their survey data and revenue data for the hotel brands tested. The
authors found significant correlations between higher revenues and
positive results for each of the four brand equity constructs, but the
correlation for brand awareness and brand associations was
approximately twice as strong as the correlation for perceived quality,
with brand loyalty falling somewhere in between. 72 In the second
study, the authors similarly sought to determine the correlation between
components of consumer-based brand equity, consumer purchase
intentions, and firm-based outcome measures such as market share and
revenue in the cellular telephone market in South Korea. 73 These
authors similarly found brand awareness to be the strongest contributor
to a consumer's decision to purchase a branded product over an
equivalent unbranded product, with consumer perceptions about the
products' physical and non-physical attributes also contributing, but
more weakly. 74 The study also found, informally, a rough correlation
between customer loyalty and market share.75
Perhaps the most important result to emerge from these studies, at
least for purposes of this Article, is that the relative contribution of each
brand equity construct is not stable across different product and service

categories.76 For some categories, such as consumer goods, awareness
may be a more important driver of the consumer's willingness to
purchase or pay a premium for a branded product versus an unbranded
one. For other categories, such as cars or luxury hotels, perceived
quality or subjective brand attributes may be more important drivers of
consumer choice. This variability strongly suggests that the searchcosts model's generalizing framework obscures important and internally
complex effects of brands. In particular, it suggests that consumers use
different cognitive strategies to guide their decision-making in different

71 Hong-bumm Kim, Woo Gon Kim & Jeong A. An, The Effect of Consumer-Based Brand
Equity on Firms' Financial Performance, 20 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 335 (2003).

Interestingly, factor analysis failed to produce an interpretation of the survey data in which both
the brand equity construct generally and the brand awareness construct in particular could
significantly account for variances in the survey responses, id. at 343 & tbl.V, suggesting a failure
of construct validity with respect to Aaker's brand equity constructs as applied to the data
generated by the study's survey. However, nonparametric correlation analysis nevertheless found
that survey data reflecting high levels of brand awareness were strongly correlated to superior
financial performance of the brand, id at 344 & tbl.VI. This odd disparity may reflect
methodological problems with the study's survey construction, discussed further in Part II.D,
infra.
72 Id at 344 & tbl.VI.
73 Srinivasan et al., supra note 42.
74 Id. at 1445-46 & tbl.7.

75 Id at 1445-46 & tbl.6.
76 See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
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contexts.77 Empirical research in psychology and consumer behavior
can shed light on these effects, but before examining these points
further a brief methodological critique of the brand equity literature is in
order.
4.

A Note on Methodological Issues

It must be admitted that as social science research goes, the
marketing literature described in this subpart invites serious
methodological criticism. First, some of the models developed in this
stream of research are directed to professional rather than academic
audiences, and as such they sometimes rely less on data than on
anecdote.78 As a result, they may be influenced by the researchers'
biases or preconceptions, their analysis may rely on cherry-picked
examples, and their conclusions may be difficult to generalize. Second,
to the extent the models or the conclusions being drawn from them are
based on data, that data is often the result of consumer surveys rather
than actual behavior in the marketplace. 79 Because what consumers say
is often significantly different than what they do, the reliability of this
data is somewhat suspect, particularly where the data is invoked to
make predictions about future consumer behavior with respect to a
brand.so Third and finally, to the extent that consumer survey responses
can be trusted as reliable indicators of consumer beliefs, mental
processes, and behavior, the qualitative research methods underlying
many of the findings discussed above, by their very nature, do not allow
for the types of quantitative analysis and conclusions typically
associated with economic decision-making by firms (or, for that matter,
by policymakers).
With respect to this last objection, three responses are in order.
First, as should be apparent from Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3 supra, the
77 For example, higher-stakes decisions may invite more deliberative thought, while in lowerstakes decisions we rely on heuristics channeled by brands. I have previously argued that this
feature of consumer decision-making justifies the inclusion of consumer sophistication as a factor
in the likelihood of confusion test for determining trademark infringement. Jeremy N. Sheff, The
(Boundedly) Rational Basis of Trademark Liability, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 370-71
(2007).
78 Compare AAKER, supra note 26, at 277-87 (setting forth the sources for Aaker's model of
brand equity, many of which are news accounts and only a minority of which represent empirical
research, let alone peer-reviewed empirical research), with Keller, supra note 40, at 19-22 (setting
forth references for Keller's original model of consumer-based brand equity, most of which are
peer-reviewed empirical studies in marketing or psychology).
79 See, e.g., Punj & Hillyer, supra note 60, at 127 (describing consumer surveys used to test
the authors' conceptual model of consumer-based brand equity).
80 Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV.
63, 93-94 & nn. 111-15 (2009) (citing sources).
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qualitative models of brand equity have been developed alongside
quantitative empirical research seeking to measure brand equity in
economically meaningful terms. Second, the qualitative methodologies
employed by marketing researchers are a mainstay of social sciences
such as psychology and sociology, and most marketing researchers rely
on methodological tools that are widely accepted within qualitative
social science disciplines to identify and ameliorate bias. 8 ' Third, the
largest and most successful companies apply the results of qualitative
research into brand equity to manage their branding and marketing
decisions. For example, Procter & Gamble (P&G)-a pioneer and
continuing leader in branding 82-uses Keller's qualitative model of
brand equity assessment as the basis for continuous monitoring of
P&G's billion-dollar brands, constructing consumer surveys to capture
consumers' qualitative evaluations of both P&G's brands and the brands
of its competitors.83 This last point similarly provides something of a
response to the first objection to the potential for bias and cherrypicking in qualitative marketing research, at least as regards the weight
to be accorded the critique. Obviously successful firms' reliance on
qualitative brand equity research does not necessarily establish the rigor
or robustness of that research, 84 but it may tend to weaken the argument
that the research is unreliable to the extent that firms that rely on it
outperform firms that do not.
With respect to the objection to using consumer survey responses
for purposes of describing or predicting actual consumer behavior in the
marketplace, rebuttal is not as easy. To some extent the acceptance of
the conclusions of marketing researchers by successful firms offers
some response. Another response lies in the largely corroborative
findings of non-survey-based experimental research in psychology and
81 On the potential for bias in qualitative behavioral research and the methodological tools
developed to avoid it, see generally Philip M. Podsakoff et al., Common Method Biases in
Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended Remedies, 88 J.

APPLIED PSYCHOL. 879 (2003). Modem qualitative research in marketing is aware of these
issues, and that awareness is reflected in reported results. See, e.g., Punj & Hillyer, supra note
60, at 128 (describing statistical tests for conceptual validity applied to the authors' study, with
results leading to qualifications of the study's conclusions).
82 AAKER, supra note 26, at 1-7.

83 See generally Randle D. Raggio & Robert P. Leone, Producing a Measure of Brand Equity
by Decomposing Brand-Benefit Beliefs into Brand and Attribute Sources (Mar. 6, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=889566 (noting P&G's use of
Keller's framework in its global equity tracking system, and proposing a streamlined system for
capturing strongly correlated data at lower cost).
84 See, e.g., Joel S. Dubow & Nancy M Childs, New Coke, Mixture Perception, and the

Flavor Balance Hypothesis, 43 J.BUs. RES. 147, 153 (1998) ("Although negative research results
are normally disappointing, they remain an important element in the epistemology of marketing.
Just because a hypothesis has not been proven, or even tested, does not mean that marketers will
not act on it.").
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behavioral economics, some of which is reviewed in the notes of this
Part and the text and notes of the next Part. But perhaps the best
response for the purposes of this Article is the one offered by Professor
Mark McKenna in his review of the marketing literature with respect to
brand extensions, to wit: This literature is "the best available evidence
regarding the empirically-oriented claims offered in support of modem
trademark protection."85 To the extent that the search-costs model
makes positive claims about the way consumers actually behave in the
marketplace, testing those claims against the available data must be
considered preferable to simply assuming the claims to be empirically
true, provided that the data's limitations are kept in mind.
One final (and crucial) methodological critique that could be
leveled generally against the qualitative models of brand equity and
specifically against the studies, described in Part I.B.3 above, that
attempt to quantify the economic value of each psychological construct
in those models, is that such studies are useful only to the extent that the
constructs that they purport to investigate are informative and welldefined with respect to the data on which they rely and the phenomena
they purport to describe. Unfortunately, it does not take much reflection
to arrive at the conclusion that these constructs are necessarily
confounded. Someone who has associations with a brand, or is loyal to
it, or has a sense of its quality, is clearly aware of the brand. 86 Similar
overlap can be expected among several of these elements however they
might be formulated, making the task of untangling their separate
contributions to economic value difficult.
One possible response to this critique is to follow Professor Kevin
Lane Keller in viewing the qualitative, psychology-based brand equity
constructs as cumulative rather than distinct, each building sequentially
on the others.87 For example, one can imagine that a consumer would
have some awareness of a brand without being able to articulate any
objective or subjective attributes of the brand, or that one would have
associations with a brand but lack sufficient experience with the brand
to develop brand loyalty, though it is difficult to imagine the reverse in
either case. With this understanding, there remain at least two reasons
to value the findings of the studies that attempt to measure the relative
85 McKenna, supra note 80, at 46.
86 Indeed, in one of the studies in question the authors condition their coding of a survey
respondent as "aware" of a brand on the respondent's ability to provide subjective attribute
judgments about the brand. Srinivasan et al., supra note 42, at 1444. In another, the authors
supplement their construct of "brand image"-conceived of as the strength and positivity of
desirable subjective, emotional, attitudinal, or otherwise intangible qualities represented by a
brand, and thus as a close relative of brand associations-by including in it survey responses
regarding the brand's familiarity. Kim et al., supra note 71, at 340, 349.
87 See supra note 60.
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contribution of each brand equity construct to the economic
performance of a brand. First, rather than attempting to parse out the
independent contributions of each brand equity construct to the
economic value of a brand, perhaps these studies can best be used to
provide some guidance on the relative marginal contributions of each
construct to that value. While the studies do not appear to have been
designed with this distinction in mind, their results, combined with
other research, may be helpful in drawing such inferences. Second, as
discussed further in the next Part, there is support to be found in other
more methodologically rigorous empirical literatures for taking such
lessons from the brand equity studies despite their obvious
methodological flaws.
II. INFORMING, PERSUADING, AND BIASING:
BRANDS INCONSUMER DECISION-MAKING
From the discussion in the previous Part, it should be clear that the
search-costs model's description of the price of a product has strong
affinities to the concept of brand equity. In both cases, there is a
conceptual division between the economic value of the brand (the brand
premium) and the economic value of the product to which it is affixed.
While the brand equity literature conceives of the brand premium as
value created by producers' marketing activities, the economics
literature sees it as representing information costs that have been shifted
from consumers to producers, who then pass this cost through to
consumers as part of the total price of the branded good.88
The emergence of a brand premium from both models of consumer
behavior might lead one to conclude that there is no serious
inconsistency between the theoretically-derived descriptive claims of
the search-costs model and the empirically-derived descriptive claims of
the brand equity literature; they could simply be different sets of labels
applied to the same phenomena. But this surface similarity masks
important differences. The search-costs model posits that consumers
are willing to pay a brand premium because the brand provides them
with information that enables them to evaluate the product against their
own preferences-information that consumers would otherwise have to
search for at a cost that would exceed the amount of the premium. The
marketing literature, in contrast, suggests a more complex set of
motivations for the consumer's willingness to pay the brand premium.
88 Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 275-80; see also Tillin Erdem & Joffre Swait, Brand
Equity as a Signaling Phenomenon, 7 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 131, 132-33 (1998) (comparing

the brand equity and information economics understandings of brand value).
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In particular, it teaches that determinants of brand value are variable and
highly dependent on commercial context: Some of a brand's economic
value-and in some markets perhaps the largest contribution to its
value-lies not in the information it conveys about the underlying
product, but in the consumer's psychological responses to the brand
itself. This Part draws out this distinction by reference to empirical
research bearing on each of the elements of brand equity described in
the previous Part.
A.

Informing and Persuading:BrandAssociations,Perceived
Quality, and Subjective vs. Objective ConsumerBeliefs

Certainly, trademarks can and do provide consumers with
information about the products and services to which they are affixed.
The brand equity construct of brand associations includes both
subjective and objective product features-the latter sometimes referred
to as product attribute associations. With respect to such objective
associations, there would again appear to be no conflict whatsoever
between the brand equity literature and the search-costs model. While
brand equity research holds that consumers will associate a brand with
certain information about the associated product's qualities, the searchcosts model holds that this association is the essence of the brand's
function.
Of course, the marketing literature also makes clear that objective
product attributes are not the only types of brand associations that
contribute to brand equity.
Subjective, emotional, and abstract
conceptual associations may also play an important role. The
distinction between these two types of associations has traditionally
been the focus of most disagreements over public policy regarding the
creation and maintenance of brands, but as will be shown, these
disagreements do not bear on the descriptive accuracy of the dominant
model of brands in legal thought.
1.

Brand Associations: Persuasive Advertising and
Subjective Attributes

The fact that subjective associations can influence purchase
decisions has long been a subject of academic interest. For decades at
least, commentators have decried "persuasive" (as contrasted with
"informative") advertising: advertising that shapes rather than responds
to consumer preferences by conjuring up emotionally charged and
objectively unfalsifiable impressions or "images" associated with the
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brand. These images, it is argued, cause consumers to base purchase
decisions on "spurious" or objectively baseless differentiations between
advertised and unadvertised products, allowing the advertiser to charge
supra-competitive prices for its products (i.e., prices higher than the
objective qualities of the product would warrant) and thereby to cause a
net loss of social welfare.89 This understanding of persuasive
advertising suggests that the brand premium does not represent the
value of information conveyed by the trademark as the search-costs
model posits, but rather that it represents a mere transfer of wealth from
consumers to producers who provide nothing of value in return. In
other words, there is an argument to be made that where it is generated
by persuasive-as opposed to informative-advertising, the brand
premium is a form of economic rent, and that expenditures on such
advertising should accordingly be classified as rent-seeking. 90
Economists in the Chicago School have formulated two responses
to this argument, both of which can be summarized by the Latin
aphorism, de gustibus non est disputandum. As explained by Professors
George Stigler and Gary Becker in an article that takes this maxim as its
One
title, the phrase is susceptible of two interpretations.91
interpretation-the one championed by Stigler and Becker-is that all
people have identical and unchanging tastes. 92 They deploy this
89 For examples of such arguments in the legal academic literature, see, Ralph S. Brown, Jr.,
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165,

1168-75 (1948); Lunney, supra note 21, at 420 n.248 (citing Brown, supra). For a recent review
of such arguments in the legal and economics literatures, see Dillbary, supra note 24, at 610-12.
Cf William S. Comanor & Thomas A. Wilson, The Effect of Advertising on Competition: A

Survey, 17 J. ECON. LIT. 453 (1979) (reviewing research on the effects of advertising on
competition).
90 See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 21, at 437 ("When we move beyond narrowly tailored
protection for marks serving an important informational role .. . protection renders direct
competition both more expensive and more difficult, [and therefore] it will tend to increase the
market power, prices, and rents associated with popular brands. The inefficiencies associated
with such protection will increase correspondingly, as deadweight costs and rent-seeking are
directly proportional to the market power and rents available.").
91 George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON.
REv. 76, 76 (1977), reprintedin BECKER, supra note 24, at 24.

92 In some iterations of this idea, advertising becomes a factor, along with the underlying
advertised good and stocks of "personal capital," to household production of abstract
"commodities" that are the ultimate objects of choice. Id.; see also Beebe, supra note 25, at
In other models, persuasive
2054-55 (critiquing this view as applied to trademarks).
advertisements (or more often the images they create) are separate and complementary "products"
vis-A-vis the goods advertised-products for which consumers may have distinct positive or
negative preferences. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of
Advertising as a Good or Bad, 108

Q. J. ECON.

941 (1993), reprintedin BECKER, supra note 24,

at 203 (developing a mathematical model of the welfare economics of advertising which treats
advertisements as separate and complementary "products" in utility functions); Dillbary, supra
note 24 (arguing, with a supporting mathematical model, that what appear to be irrational
"snobbish" preferences for status goods are better understood as rational preferences for a
combination of the underlying physical good and the separate complementary goods represented
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interpretation as an assumption for purposes of constructing
mathematical models of behavior that, whatever their usefulness, 93 are
not particularly relevant to the present discussion, largely because they
reflect the normative assumptions of the other, more traditional
interpretation of the de gustibus maxim. 94
That traditional interpretation is a standard analytical tool of
welfare economics: the use of subjective individual preferences as the
measure of utility. As Stigler and Becker put it in characterizing this
view, "desires themselves are data."95 Thus, if a consumer harbors a
sincere preference for goods associated in his mind with subjective
images that a brand owner has cultivated through advertising and other
marketing techniques, and is willing to pay a premium for such goods,
then the image (however generated) is a legitimate component of the
brand's economic value. 96 Moreover, it is irrelevant to this analysis
why the individual harbors such a subjective preference-even if he is
in the extreme minority, or has what one might consider poor taste, or
has been persuaded by others to hold an idiosyncratic preference.
In short, this approach responds to the possibility of uninformative
advertising influencing consumer choice not as a challenge to the
descriptive accuracy of the search-costs model (and thus not as a
critique of its conclusion that trademarks increase aggregate social
welfare), but rather as a subject of purely normative interest. The
normative position of the welfare economist in this debate is that of the
classical liberal or the modem libertarian: No one (and especially not
the state) has a better claim to judge what is in the consumer's best
by the information value of the trademark and the intangible images associated with that
trademark); Economides, supra note 17, at 535.
93 See generally Tyler Cowen, Are All Tastes Constant And Identical? A Critique of Stigler
and Becker, 11 J.ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 127 (1989) (critiquing Stigler & Becker's models).
94 See Gary S. Becker, Preferences and Values, in BECKER, supra note 24, at 3-4 ("This book

retains the assumption that individuals behave so as to maximize utility while extending the
definition of individual preferences to include personal habits and addictions, . . . advertising,...
and other neglected behavior."); id at 6 ("[Stigler & Becker's] assumption that extended
preferences are stable was intended not as a philosophical or methodological 'law,' but as a
productive way to analyze and explain behavior.").
95 Stigler & Becker, supra note 91, at 76.
96 Economides, supra note 17, at 535 ("I believe that perception advertising provides
consumers with products (mental images) that they value, and which would have been scarce in
its absence. It is not a direct waste. Some resources are wasted, however, in the effort to tie in
the desired image with the advertised product."). This is in keeping with most modem welfare
economics analysis, which disavows any value judgments about how individuals derive
subjective utility. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 29, at 979-85 (defining utility as a
measure of well-being that "incorporates in a positive way everything that an individual might
value-goods and services that the individual can consume, social and environmental amenities,
personally held notions of fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others, and so forth ... [, and]
reflects in a negative way harms to his or her person and property, costs and inconveniences, and
anything else that the individual might find distasteful," explicitly accounting for individuals'
subjective tastes).
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interest than the consumer himself, regardless of how he comes to
understand that interest. 97 The competing normative position-which
sees the autonomous consumer as a fiction and the government as
unavoidably linked with the market 98-is tarred with the brush of
paternalism. 99
The argument of this Article does not require choosing one of these
irreconcilable normative positions, 00 because the brand equity literature
and the search-costs model are on the same side of the debate. Both
conceive of subjective images, like objective product features, as bona
fide preferences of the consumer that represent legitimate sources of
positive economic value. As discussed above, the brand equity
construct of brand associations can be divided up into subcategories,
including product attributes (information about the objective qualities of
the product) and non-product attributes (including consumers' mental
images about subjective qualities of the product, such as value, prestige,
personality, etc.).o'0
These latter associations are considered an
97 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 29, at 1339-50 (arguing against most policies that would
purport to substitute the preferences of an analyst or policymaker for the subjective preferences of
an individual, even when the individual's preferences are based on incomplete information or are
objectionable in some way). But see id. at 1330-34 (recognizing some instances in which policy
or legal intervention may be necessary to adjust subjective preferences, for example where those
preferences are based on incomplete information or cognitive limitations).
98 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 127-28 (Mariner Books 1998)

(1958) ("[T]he institutions of modern advertising and salesmanship ... cannot be reconciled with
the notion of independently determined desires for their central function is to create desires-to
bring into being wants that previously did not exist . ... [O]utlays for the manufacturing of
demand for the product ... must be integrated with the theory of consumer demand. They are too
big to be ignored. But such integration means recognizing that wants are dependent on
production. It accords to the producer the function both of making the goods and of making the
desires for them."). See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE
(1967) (arguing that in the modem economy powerful firms, organized labor, and government are
of necessity both partners and competitors in the "planning" of economic activity, including
consumer demand).
99 As Professor Ralph Brown put it with characteristic wit and irony over sixty years ago:
If, as is undeniably the case, consumers will pay more for an advertised brand than for
its unheralded duplicate, then consumers must get more satisfaction out of the
advertised brand. The nature of the satisfaction is of concern only to the moralist.
Though this argument can easily be pushed to absurdity-suppose it was to the interest
of the advertisers to consume half the national product in persuasion?-it seems
plausible if it is based on the dogma of consumer autonomy. Then anyone who
questions the untrammeled use of influence by the seller and its uncoerced acceptance
by the buyer is at best a Puritan, at worst a Fascist.
Brown, supra note 89, at 1181; see also Lemley, supra note 24, at 1693 ("My preference for Diet
Coke over Diet Pepsi or any other cola drink may be an irrational one, induced by childhood
memories of teaching the world to sing or some similar promotional effort. But in a free market
economy, perhaps the choice should be mine to make, for good or ill.").
100 Cf Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1756

(2003) ("[B]ecause Becker and Stigler's model is essentially nonfalsifiable, sympathizers of the
Galbraithian viewpoint are unlikely to find it persuasive.").
101 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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important contributor to brand equity, and the brand equity literature has
been at pains to analyze them empirically-without ever casting doubt
on their relevance to consumer decision-making or the appropriateness
of that relevance. This normative agreement is fortuitous insofar as it
allows for direct comparison of the empirically oriented claims of the
search-costs model and the brand equity literature.
2.

Perceived Quality: Objective Attributes, Subjective Beliefs

Moving from the brand equity element of brand associations to the
element of perceived quality, the brand equity literature and the searchcosts model again appear to be largely coherent. Indeed, perceived
quality is largely conceptualized as a subset or derivative of consumer
brand associations. There is a qualification, however: The brand equity
construct of perceived quality explicitly contemplates that consumers'
subjective assessments of the quality of a branded product may deviate
from available and legitimate objective measures of the product's
quality. 102 This qualification could be understood as posing a challenge
to the search-costs model. After all, a trademark cannot fairly be said to
be lowering information costs in circumstances where the information it
conveys is inaccurate,1 03 and a disparity between consumers' subjective
interpretation of a mark's quality message and the objective quality of
the product to which the mark is affixed can be understood as precisely
such a circumstance.1 04
This is a somewhat different challenge to the search-costs model
than the challenge posed by persuasive advertising. With purely
subjective images, the question whether a consumer's preference for
such images is entitled to respect is not susceptible to empirical
analysis. Rather, the only relevant question is a purely normative one:
whether the consumer's subjective preferences should be accepted or
whether someone else's (also subjective) preferences should be
substituted therefor. 0 5 With respect to perceived quality (and, for that
matter, any other product attribute for which a consumer's subjective
evaluation may diverge from an available objective measure), the
situation is somewhat different. In such a case, the disparity between a
102 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
103 Ellen R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the Law of False Advertising, 8

J. LEG. STuD. 527, 532 (1979) ("If consumers are misled by advertising and choose a product
because of a falsehood, they have suffered an injury and resources have been misallocated.").
104 See Erdem & Swait, supra note 88, at 139 & n.2.
105 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. "Someone else" here might be understood
to include the consumer himself as observed at a time prior to exposure to persuasive content, a
hypothetical reasonable person, or a policymaker.
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subjective measure and an objective one demands justification from a
model that derives its calculations of economic value from the
subjective rather than the objective measure.
To illustrate this distinction with an example, imagine that I have a
subjective preference for low-fat foods, and am willing to pay a
premium for them over higher-fat alternatives. I might routinely buy a
particular brand of snack food-for example, LIGHTBITES-because
advertisements for LIGHTBITES as well as the name itself lead me to
believe that products bearing this mark have a low fat content. Now
imagine that, in fact, the fat content of the product in question is much
higher than its advertisements led me to believe-or that it becomes so
over time due to a change in manufacturing. The difference between
the disparities under discussion in this subpart and the purely subjective
preferences discussed in the last subpart is analogous to the difference
between my mistaken belief that LIGHTBITES has a low fat content
and the basic fact that I prefer low-fat foods. The preference itself, so
long as it is sincerely held, is not susceptible to empirical falsification.
The belief that the product in question satisfies my preference is.
Thus, brand equity's tolerance of a divergence between subjective
beliefs about a product's qualities and the product's actual qualities
poses a challenge to the search-costs model that cannot be answered
with the normative assumption that subjective preference-satisfaction is
the best measure of utility. If I pay a premium for a product that I
believe will satisfy my preferences when in fact it does not, and my
preferences are the most appropriate measure of utility, then at least
from an objective standpoint I have not received the economic benefit
that would allow one to conclude, as in the soft-drink example
described in Part I, that my purchase of the product increases aggregate
economic welfare. Depending on the degree of the disparity between
my belief about the product's objective qualities and the truth about
those qualities, a single such transaction, standing alone, may still
increase social welfare, it may have no net effect, or it may decrease
social welfare. And depending on the prevalence of such disparities in
the marketplace (and on my ability to discover and guard against them),
trademark protection may promote, or may impede, aggregate economic
efficiency. On this latter point, the effects of brand awareness and
brand loyalty are important considerations.
B. The BiasingBrand: BrandAwareness,
BrandLoyalty, and Subjective Responses to
Objective Data

Brands can influence our beliefs, preferences, and behavior even in
spite of ourselves. Our subjective beliefs about objectively knowable
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things are often shaped by irrelevant facts and are often stubbornly
resistant to relevant ones. Key to this dynamic is the phenomenon of
familiarity-the simple fact that one has encountered something before.
As discussed below, we tend to respond to a sense of familiarity
differently than we respond to other types of information, and these
differences bear on the types of behaviors that the trademark system
purports to regulate. Put simply, consumers are more likely to choose,
and less likely to stop choosing, a brand with which they are familiar as
compared to a brand with which they are unfamiliar.
Two features of this fundamental psychological preference for the
familiar are of particular relevance to the current discussion. First, a
sense of familiarity need not be supported by any other information
about the familiar brand or the product underlying it to influence
choice-to the contrary, a sense of familiarity can actually lead
individuals to form otherwise groundless beliefs concerning objective
product attributes of a familiar brand. Second, this type of familiaritydriven response can often be resistant to new information about the
brand, even where that information contradicts previously held beliefs.
The first of these features of familiarity-based preferences is related to
the brand equity construct of brand awareness, while the second is
related to brand loyalty.
1.

Brand Awareness and the Power of Exposure

Brand awareness contributes to brand equity precisely because
consumers tend to prefer the familiar.106 This preference holds even
absent other information about the underlying products and even if the
familiar brand is considerably more expensive than alternatives. 0 7
"Especially for low-involvement products like soap, chewing gum,
paper towels, sugar, disposable pens, or facial tissues, familiarity can
sometimes drive the buying decision. In the absence of motivation to
engage in attribute evaluation, familiarity may be enough." 08 The role
106 AAKER, supra note 26, at 64.

107 See infra notes 108-10 and sources cited therein; see also Wayne D. Hoyer & Steven P.
Brown, Effects of Brand Awareness on Choice for a Common, Repeat-Purchase Product, 17 J.

CONSUMER RES. 141, 142-45 (1990) (demonstrating experimentally in the peanut butter product
category that consumers who were aware of a brand without ever having purchased it
overwhelmingly chose the familiar brand over unfamiliar ones); Emma K. Macdonald & Byron
M. Sharp, Brand Awareness Effects on Consumer Decisionmaking for a Common, Repeat

Purchase Product: A Replication, 48 J. BUS. RES. 5 (2000) (replicating the Hoyer & Brown result
with respect to familiar-brand preference in the soft drink category, while also extending the
finding to experienced consumers and finding that the preference for the familiar over the
unfamiliar is only moderately sensitive to price).
108 Id. at 64-65.
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of familiarity in building positive affective responses (i.e., "liking") and
structuring choice tasks is well-documented not only in consumer
psychology literature,1 09 but in cognitive psychology studies as well. 10
Importantly, these effects of familiarity and liking can be cultivated by
mere repetition of a brand name," such as the repetition of the
109 See, e.g., Prakash Nedungadi, Recall and Consumer Consideration Sets: Influencing
Choice Without Altering Brand Evaluations, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 263 (1990) (demonstrating

that priming consumers with a brand prior to a choice task can increase the probability that the
primed brand will be selected, even without influencing the consumer's level of liking the brand);
see also Tim Ambler et al., Salience and Choice: Neural Correlates of Shopping Decisions, 21

PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 247, 253-54 (2004) (discussing experimental results showing
significant correlation between brand familiarity and selection of the brand, and quicker decisionmaking when faced with a familiar brand than with unfamiliar brands); Arch G. Woodside &
Elizabeth J. Wilson, Effects of Consumer Awareness of Brand Advertising on Preference, 25 J.

ADVERTISING RES. 41 (1985) (finding significant differences in purchase likelihood among
brands depending on how quickly the consumer was able to recall them when given a product
category).
110 Some of the discussion herein recapitulates the author's prior research on the implications
of familiarity, recognition, and choosing by liking for trademark law. Sheff, supra note 77, at
358-65. That earlier work attempted to give a descriptive account of existing doctrine rather than
the normative analysis of its theoretical foundations set forth in the present Article. Other legal
commentators have begun to take notice of these features of consumer psychology as well. See,
e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 160-65

(2010).
On the role of recognition and familiarity in preference formation, see GERD GIGERENZER,
PETER M. TODD & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 41
(1999) (noting that test subjects tend to prefer recognized options to unrecognized ones in choice
tasks); Shane Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT at 548, 550-53 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel
Kahneman eds., 2002) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT] (noting that
increasing test subjects' familiarity with a stimulus increases their positive affective response to
the stimulus); Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, Models of Ecological Rationality: The
Recognition Heuristic, 109 PSYCHOL. REV. 75 (2002) (providing a theoretical explanation for the
preference for recognized items). But cf Benjamin E. Hilbig, Edgar Erdfelder & Rudiger F. Pohl,
One-Reason Decision Making Unveiled: A Measurement Model of the Recognition Heuristic, 36
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 123 (2010) (arguing that
recognition alone is only likely to serve as the exclusive determinant of choice where the
decisionmaker has no further information about the recognized stimulus, and that where further
knowledge is present it is likely to be evaluated as part of the choice task).
On choosing by liking, see, for example, Frederick, supra, at 550 (describing the use of an
affect heuristic-an intuitive sense of liking or disliking-as a means of generating choices
without deliberate reasoning). See generally Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra, at 397 (describing the affect heuristic and the
empirical data from which it is inferred); R.B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need
No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 151, 155 (1980) ("Quite often 'I decided in favor of X' is
no more than 'I liked X.' . . . We buy the cars we 'like,' choose the jobs and houses that we find
'attractive,' and then justify those choices by various reasons. . . .").
Ill Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research,
1968-1987, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 265 (1989) (reviewing studies that document the "mere
exposure effect"); Nedungadi, supra note 109; Slovic et al., supra note 110, at 400 ("[Wlhen
objects are presented to an individual repeatedly, the 'mere exposure' is capable of creating a
positive attitude or preference for these objects."). Importantly, marketing researchers have
shown that brand repetition can increase choice probability not only for new brands about which
the consumer lacks other information, but also for known brands in mature product categories,
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"HeadOn" brand name in the Miralus ad discussed in the introduction to
this Article.
Moreover, brand awareness affects more than mere preference: A
simple sense of familiarity can generate subjective consumer beliefs
about objective facts that have no logical relationship to the sense of
familiarity. For example, a sense of familiarity-even an unconscious
sense of familiarity based on nothing more than incidental exposure to a
brand name-often gives rise to an affective (i.e., emotional) sense of
liking.112 This positive effect can cause consumers to perceive a
familiar brand as more beneficial, and less risky, than unfamiliar
alternatives." 3 Repetition of exposure-such as through repetitive but
uninformative advertising-enhances this "mere exposure effect."1 14
Familiarity deriving from exposure to advertisements can cause
consumers to seek out, or at least consider, the familiar brand as an
option when shopping in the brand's product category-making
ultimate purchase of the brand much more likely. 15 Perhaps most
importantly, consumers tend to believe that products bearing familiar
brands are superior to unbranded equivalents in overall quality and
other relevant objective product attributes, particularly attributes that are
not readily apparent from pre-purchase inspection." 6
In short,

primarily by increasing the likelihood that the brand will generate top-of-mind awareness. See
generally Giles D'Souza & Ram C. Rao, Can Repeating an Advertisement More Frequently than
the CompetitionAffect Brand Preference in a Mature Market?, 59 J. MARKETING 32 (1995).

I have provided a fuller exposition of research documenting the "mere exposure effect"
the ability of mere repetition to increase positive affect and subjective judgments of credibilityin the context of political campaigns. See Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level PlayingField:
Knowledge, Affect, and Repetition in Public Debate, 75 Mo. L. REv. 143, 157-61 (2010).
112 See generally Jochim Hansen & Michaela Winke, Liking What's Familiar: The
Importance of Unconscious Familiarityin the Mere-Exposure Effect, 27 Soc. COGNITION 161

(2009) (demonstrating that mere exposure to brand names increases liking for the names
independently of conscious recognition of the exposure); Chris Janiszewski, Preattentive Mere
Exposure Effects, 20 J. CONSUMER RES. 376 (1993) (same). But see Aric Rindfleisch & J.Jeffrey
Inman, Explaining the Familiarity-LikingRelationship: Mere Exposure, InformationAvailability,
or Social Desirability?, 9 MARKETING LETTERS 5 (1998) (arguing, based on an experiment that

employed some admittedly transparent manipulations of test subjects, that mere exposure is less
likely to lead to the familiarity-liking relationship than other mechanisms, such as social
conformity pressures).
113 See Slovic et al.,supranote 110, at400-01, 410-13.
114 See supranote I11 and sources cited therein.
115 See generally Stewart Shapiro, Deborah J. Maclnnis & Susan E. Heckler, The Effects of
Incidental Ad Exposure on the Formation of Consideration Sets, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 94

(1997). This effect obtains even if the brand was unknown prior to exposure, though the effect is
larger for exposure that "primes" consumers with already familiar brands. See generally Sarah L.
Coates, Laurie T. Butler & Dianne C. Berry, Implicit Memory and Consumer Choice: The
Mediating Role ofBrandFamiliarity,20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. I 101 (2006).
116 Srini S. Srinivasan & Brian D. Till, Evaluation of Search, Experience and Credence
Attributes: Role of Brand Name and Product Trial, 11 J. PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 417, 422-24

(2002) (finding that consumers believe that national-label brands of fruit cocktail and facial
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consumers respond to marketing efforts that make no product attribute
claims as if they had made such claims.117
Unlike the mere sense of familiarity that generates them, or even
the subjective images underlying the debate over persuasive advertising,
these types of subjective beliefs about objectively measurable product
attributes are unquestionably relevant to consumer choice tasks. This
feature of consumer psychology helps explain why uninformative but
repetitive marketing tactics such as the HeadOn advertisement can
generate a return for the producers who deploy them. By doing nothing
more than repeating its brand name, a producer can invoke the
machinery of consumer psychology to implant product attribute beliefs
that the producer never explicitly claims. These beliefs can lead the
consumer to seek out, to prefer, to purchase, and even to pay a premium
for the producer's products.
As opposed to preferences for specific objective product features
or for subjective product images, preferences for familiar brands over
unfamiliar ones require some explanation in order to be incorporated
into the search-costs model, if indeed they can be incorporated at all.
Two approaches to this problem are extant in the literature. One argues
that preferences for the familiar are rational approaches to the problem
of drawing inferences about quality; the other argues that such
preferences are evidence of boundedly rational consumer decisionmaking.
The former approach, while theoretically elegant and
consistent with the neoclassical roots of the search-costs model, turns
out not to pass empirical scrutiny. The latter approach, while more
consistent with observed consumer behavior, undermines the
categorical theoretical conclusions of the search-costs model, and
requires that the model's conclusions regarding the welfare effects of
trademark protection be significantly qualified.
a.

The Rational Actor Model: Familiarity as Quality Signal

The fact that a brand is familiar to consumers because it advertises,
some argue, is rationally related to the brand's quality, by a certain
logic. Because advertising is expensive, the fact that a firm advertises is
thought to signal to consumers that the firm can afford the expense,
which in turn signals both that the firm believes that its product will
tissues are tastier and softer, respectively, than generic counterparts prior to actually trying either
product).
117 Another, related strain of research demonstrates that consumers are likely to infer product
attribute claims from unrelated, or even uninformative, claims made in advertisements. See
Katya Assaf, Magical Thinking in Trademark Law 10-12 (May 13, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1606907 (reviewing the literature).
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satisfy consumers enough to induce repeat purchases and that the firm is
efficient enough to recover its sunk advertising costs from profits on
such repeat purchases." 8 In short, advertising-even if it provides no
direct information-is argued to act as a kind of satisfaction guarantee.
This "money-burning" theory of advertising posits that any conspicuous
and unrecoverable expenditure by a producer can be understood as
signaling high quality to consumers."l 9 While this understanding of
advertising has been qualified in important ways since its first
formulation 20 and has been hypothesized to result at least in part from
different (albeit related) mechanisms from the chain of reasoning
described herein,121 signaling theory in general appears to offer the only
argument that purely uninformative, non-persuasive advertising could
be consistent with the search-costs model.
Even some Chicago School economists find the claim that
uninformative advertising signals product quality hard to square with
their experience.1 22 More generally, empirical support for the boldest
claim of signaling theory-the prediction that higher advertising
expenditures will correlate with objectively higher quality-is, even in
118 Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role ofMarket Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 629-33 (1981); Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information,

82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 731-34 (1974). See generally Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and
Advertising Signals of ProductQuality, 94 J. POL. EcON. 796 (1986) (developing a mathematical

model to describe the quality-signaling functions of both prices and advertising levels); Richard
E. Kihistrom & Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal,92 J. POL. ECON. 427 (1984) (same,
for advertising alone); see also Lemley, supra note 24, at 1690 & n.14 (acknowledging the
signaling literature).
119 Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 118, at 799-800 (noting that the signaling analysis of
advertising "applies to any observable expenditure that does not directly provide information or
otherwise improve demand or costs. A shop in a high-rent location or highly visible corporate
social responsibility activities are obvious examples.").
120 See, e.g., Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis ofAdvertising, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS.

ORG. 1701, 1791 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007) ("[N]o systematic correlation
between advertising and quality is expected, since the relationship reflects market circumstances
and the simultaneous use of price and advertising as signals of quality."); Milgrom & Roberts,
supra note 118, at 814-20 (noting the dependence of advertising's usefulness as a signal on other
factors such as cost structure and price signals); Hao Zhao, Raising Awareness and Signaling
Quality to Uninformed Consumers: A Price-AdvertisingModel, 19 MARKETING SC. 390 (2000)

(noting that pure money-burning advertising is not necessarily rational or welfare-increasing
where advertising not only conveys indirect signals but also conveys direct information).
121 See Bagwell, supra note 120, at 1779-85 (describing other potential signaling functions of
advertising such as reminding prior consumers of their positive experiences with the brand and
allowing producers to target their outreach to consumers expected to react favorably to the
producers' products).
122 See, e.g., Becker & Murphy, supra note 92, at 944 ("We do not believe that the intensive
advertising for Miller beer, Chevrolet cars, or Marlboro cigarettes, to take a few examples, is
signaling exceptionally high product quality .... Moreover, the pure signaling interpretation
implies that companies should advertise how much they spend on advertising, yet almost no
companies do that."). But see Klein & Leffler, supra note 118, at 631 (arguing that
advertisements pointing out that the firm has advertised in the past-"as seen on TV"-type
messages-allow consumers to infer the magnitude of cumulative advertising expenses).
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the view of one prominent signaling theorist, lacking.123 Rather,
correlations between advertising and quality are found only in particular
limited circumstances-such as where the advertising in question
conveys direct product information such as objective quality
rankings,124 or where the product category is mature enough that
consumers can be expected to already have significant independent
information on product attributes, and production costs can be expected
to be relatively low.1 25 Obviously neither of these circumstances
addresses the soundness of signaling theory as a categorical description
of purely uninformative advertising directed at uncertain consumers.
Despite the absence of any systematic correlation between
advertising levels and product quality, there is empirical evidence to
support one of signaling theory's subsidiary claims. As one would
expect given the psychological effects of familiarity, consumers
perceive relatively high advertising costs as indicative of relatively high
quality, at least up to a point.126 In other words, the search for empirical
validation of signaling theory's boldest claim instead establishes facts
key to this Article's inquiry into consumer decision-making: first, that
the preference for the familiar not only can, but does generate a
divergence between subjective and objective quality measures, and
second, that this divergence is not consistent in all commercial

123 Compare Bagwell, supra note 120, at 1774-91 (reviewing and elaborating on the
theoretical literature in signaling, including the author's own contributions), with id. at 1746-48
(reviewing the empirical literature on correlations between advertising and quality and concluding
that there is no "systematic positive relationship between advertising and product quality"). See
also, e.g., Herbert J. Rotfeld & Kim B. Rotzoll, Advertising and Product Quality: Are Heavily
Advertised Products Better?, 10 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 33, 46 (1976) ("Do heavily advertised

products tend to be of higher quality? On the basis of this study the answer would have to be a
qualified 'possibly."'); Gerard J. Tellis & Claes Fornell, The Relationship Between Advertising
and Product Quality over the ProductLife Cycle: A Contingency Theory, 25 J. MARKETING RES.

64, 64 (1988) (noting the inconsistency of the empirical evidence on the correlation of advertising
levels and quality).
124 See generally, e.g., Erdem & Swait, supra note 88 (proposing signaling theory as an

explanation of brand equity, through a model that views effective "signals" as dependent on clear
and credible product claims); cf Robert B. Archibald, Clyde A. Haulman & Carlisle E. Moody,
Jr., Quality, Price, Advertising, and Published Quality Ratings, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 351-52

(1983) (finding a correlation between advertising levels and objective quality in the running shoe
category but only after objective quality rankings are published and "are used extensively in
advertising and in some cases on packaging, [so that] there is an incentive for advertisers to align
their advertising strategies with the ratings").
125 See generally, e.g., Tellis & Fornell, supra note 123 (finding a higher correlation between
advertising levels and quality at later stages of the product life cycle).
126 See generally, e.g., Amna Kirmani, The Effect of Perceived Advertising Costs on Brand

Perceptions, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 160 (1990); see also Bagwell, supra note 120, at 1747-48
(summarizing similar research by Kirmani and others); cf supra note 110 and sources cited
therein.
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Moreover, this evidence suggests an alternative
contexts. 12 7
explanation for consumers' tendency to ascribe superior objective
attributes to familiar brands: Consumers do not approach decision tasks
the way the search-costs model assumes they do.
b.

The Behavioralist Model: Brand Awareness as
Bounded Rationality

Rather than reflecting a rational evaluation of objective
information, consumer decision-making bears all the hallmarks of
bounded rationality. That is, it reflects our reliance on heuristics, or
intuitive cognitive short-cuts, that cause decisions to deviate in
predictable ways from decisions guided by fully rational-but more
cognitively taxing-thought processes. 1 28 Cognitive psychologists have
cited the mere exposure effect and the related preference for the familiar
as among the heuristics we rely on in an effort to avoid undue cognitive
effort in making decisions. 129
Brand awareness thus may be framed in terms of the behavioralist
critique of the neoclassical law and economics championed by the
Chicago School and reflected in the search-costs model. 130 However,
the mere fact that observed decision-making depends on heuristics and

127 Bagwell, supra note 120, at 1748 ("[T]he empirical research described here ... indicates
clearly that no single view of advertising is valid in all circumstances. This in itself is progress,
and especially so when compared to the absolutist tone adopted in many of the initial discussions
of advertising."). Given that even a consumer perception of a correlation between advertising and
quality would provide even low-quality producers an incentive to advertise, it makes sense that
there would have to be limits to the effectiveness of such a signaling strategy, but it seems that
the precise nature of those limits is highly context-specific.
128 The concept of bounded rationality finds its roots in the work of Herbert A. Simon on
"satisficing"-decision-making strategies that attempt to approach optimal results as closely as
possible with the minimum possible cognitive effort. See generally, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON,
MODELS OF MAN (1957); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J.

ECON. 99 (1955) [hereinafter Simon, Rational Choice]. The concept was further developed
through the heuristics-and-biases research program in cognitive psychology and behavioral
economics, see generally, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for

Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003), which gained currency in legal
scholarship over the past two decades as a response to perceived shortcomings of the law-andeconomics movement. See generally, e.g., John D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
BehavioralismSeriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999);
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
129 See supra notes 110-11 and sources cited therein; see also GERD GIGERENZER, GUT
FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 126 (2007) ("Why do firms invest in this

type of advertisement? The answer is to increase brand-name recognition, important because of
consumers' reliance on the recognition heuristic.").
130 For a summary of this line of critiques, see generally Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 128.
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biases' 3 ' that cause it to diverge from fully rational decision-making
does not necessarily imply that models that assume rational behavior
(such as the search-costs model) are unreliable. As Professor Richard
Epstein has forcefully argued, the assumption of rational behaviorwhile clearly falsel 32-may be a sufficiently close approximation of
actual behavior that it can support useful and tractable models for
purposes of informing policy.1 33 And Professor Epstein's position finds
some support in the cognitive psychology literature, in which the "fastand-frugal" strain of heuristics and biases research argues that reliance
on heuristics and biases is so widespread precisely because, in the
words of Professor Herbert Simon,134 it "satisfices": It provides a
cognitively cheap and acceptably close approximation of more rigorous
(and rational) decision-making processes.1 35
Professor Oren Bar-Gill, a leading behavioralist, has acknowledged
as much in responding to defenders of neoclassical law and economics:
"The question is not whether individuals make mistakes. Sure they do.
The question is whether these mistakes merit legal intervention." 36
This question, in turn, requires an analysis of: (1) the magnitude and
direction of the discrepancies between rational behavior and actual
behavior; (2) the extent to which strategic actors are able to exploit such
discrepancies in welfare-reducing ways; and (3) the costs of attempting
to thwart such strategic behavior through legal intervention. 37
By and large, defenders of the search-costs model do not rely on
the proposition that branding-induced divergences of subjective and
objective product attribute measures are in fact trivially small. Rather,
131 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
132 Richard A. Epstein, Second-Order Rationality, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 355, 357
(Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) ("The implicit cognitive assumptions that

underlie this [neoclassical law-and-economics] model are vulnerable on the simplest and most
powerful of grounds: they are false.").
133 See generally id. Extending his position further, Professor Epstein argues that individual
learning and market forces can be expected to minimize the divergence of actual behavior from
assumed behavior over time and that the social costs and dubious efficacy of government
intervention counsel for a strong presumption against behavioralist-economics-informed legal
reforms. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market
Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 111 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, The NeoclassicalEconomics of
Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REv. 803 (2008) [hereinafter Epstein, Neoclassical
Economics].
134 See generally Simon, Rational Choice, supra note 128.
135 Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of
Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 650 (1996).
136 Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749,

749 (2008).
137 See Bar-Gill, supra note 136, at 111 (describing a series of steps for determining whether
"imperfect rationality" warrants government intervention in a particular market).
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the model's defenders rely on the second step of the analysis described
above. They posit that consumer learning will correct any such
divergences in ways that would defeat attempted strategic behavior by
brand owners:
To see this,
[T]rademarks have a self-enforcing feature ....
consider what happens when a brand's quality is inconsistent.
Because consumers will learn that the trademark does not enable
them to relate their past to future consumption experiences, the
branded product will be like a good without a trademark. The
trademark will not lower search costs, so consumers will be
unwilling to pay more for the branded than for the unbranded good.
As a result, the firm will not earn a sufficient return on its trademark
promotional expenditures to justify making them. A similar
argument shows that a firm with a valuable trademark would be
reluctant to lower the quality of its brand because it would suffer a
capital loss on its investment in the trademark.' 38
It should be clear that, in this line of argument, supporters of the
search-costs model are making an empirical rather than a normative
claim. In response to the possibility that brands could cause consumers
to believe objectively false information about product quality, the
model's supporters assume additional facts. Specifically, they assume
that consumers will, over time at least, respond to a divergence between
subjective and objective measures of a product's objectively measurable
qualities by reorienting their subjective assessments in the direction of
objective reality: Subjective assessments will become more accurate
with experience and learning. Indeed, the theoretical models of
signaling theory all rest on similar-and similarly untestedassumptions.139 Thus, unlike the purely normative question underlying
138 Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 270. But see J. Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks as a

Media for False Advertising, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 327, 339 (2009) ("A seller may pass-off its
own product, not as someone else's, but as possessing attributes that it does not have ... [and]
consumers rarely have the means and resources to detect the fraud.").
139 See, e.g., Bagwell, supra note 120, at 1787 (setting forth assumptions of the author's
theoretical signaling model, including that "[clonsumers observe [price] and [advertising] but not
[quality], form a belief [as to quality,] and then demand a quantity[; that a]fter any consumption
experience... consumers observe the [actual] quality[; and that] a consumer would never
knowingly purchase a low-quality product"); Klein & Leffler, supra note 118, at 620 ("If
producers are to have an incentive to produce high quality products .. . consumers must somehow
reward high quality production and punish low quality production. We assume . . . [i]f a
consumer receives a product of a quality at least as high as implicitly contracted for, he will
continue to purchase [from the product's seller]. On the other hand, if quality is less than
contracted for, all consumers cease to purchase from the particular sampled 'cheating' firm.");
Nelson, supra note 118, at 730-31 ("The major control that consumers have over the market for
[unobservable] qualities is whether they repeat the purchase of a brand or not. This power is
sufficient to authenticate any statement [by the producer concerning such qualities]." (internal
citation omitted)); Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 118, at 798-99 ("Nelson ... argued that,
because a high-quality product is more likely to attract repeat purchases, an initial sale is, ceteris
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the debate over persuasive advertising, the search-costs model's
response to the problem of the objectively mistaken consumer is
susceptible to challenge by contradictory empirical evidence.
To some extent, the assumption that consumers update their
assessments of objectively measurable product attributes to conform to
new data is supported by the brand equity literature, which provides
some evidence for a potential collapse of brand equity if a brand owner
repeatedly, consistently, and egregiously fails to maintain levels of
product quality consistent with consumer expectations.140 However,
this acceptance is subject to an important qualification: the
countervailing effects of brand loyalty. As will be seen, the assumption
that consumers respond to new information that is inconsistent with
their previously-held beliefs by modifying their beliefs to comport with
the new information-an important component of the descriptive claims
undergirding the search-costs model-is intuitively attractive,
psychologically comforting, and very often wrong.
2.

Brand Loyalty and the Power of Inertia

The brand equity construct of brand loyalty challenges the
assumption that consumers respond to objective evidence inconsistent
with their beliefs by adjusting those beliefs to comport with the new
information. As Aaker explains:
In many situations it is difficult to get rid of customers-to get them
to move to a competitor. You literally have to work at it .... The
fact is that customers do not like to change; you almost have to beat
some of them off with a baseball bat .... Changing brands requires
effort, especially if the decision involves substantial investment or
risk. Further, positive attitudes toward an incumbent brand are likely
to develop which will not only justify but enhance prior decisions.
People do not like to admit that they were wrong-it is much easier
to rationalize prior decisions. In truth an enormous inertia exists in
consumer choice. The familiar is comfortable and reassuring.141

paribus, more valuable to a high-quality producer .... This relationship would then provide the
basis for the correlation of quality with the net benefits of signaling that is needed .... In this
paper we offer a modeling based on the repeat sales . . . .").
140 See, e.g., Aaker, supra note 26, at 78-85 (documenting the destruction of the value of the
Schlitz brand as a result of a series of production changes that generated results in conflict with
consumer's expectations of beer quality).
141 Id. at 49.
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Because of the preference for the familiar and the risk involved in
abandoning a familiar brand for an unfamiliar one,142 brand loyalty
tends to be rather stable. This stability can be seen in market shares:
One study that followed a broad range of consumer products over a
sixty-year period found that the market leader was almost never
dislodged.143 As Aaker notes, "[iun some mature-product classes the
only way to become the leading brand is to have been born that way." 1 "
A supporter of the search-costs model might well argue that this
stability is the product of rational consumer behavior in response to the
problem of risky choice in an environment of incomplete information.
If a rational consumer is unsure about a product's attributes, expected
utility theory-which is built on the same neoclassical economics
foundation that informs the search-costs model-would predict that she
will discount the value of that product in proportion to the degree of her
uncertainty. 145 This principle of choice under conditions of uncertainty
is reflected in such timeworn common-sense maxims as "a bird in the
hand is worth two in the bush" and "the devil you know is better than
the devil you don't." In keeping with this folk wisdom, expected utility
theory predicts that an unfamiliar potential substitute product will have
to offer steep discounts to successfully compete for consumer dollars
with an equivalent or even an inferior familiar product.146
142 Id. at 44 ("If the current system works, even if there are problems, there is always the risk
that a new system will be worse. A consumer ... may be reluctant, even when unhappy, to try
unknowns.").
143 Id at 70 & tbl.3-4 (citing Thomas S. Wurster, The Leading Brands: 1925-1985, in BOSTON
CONSULTING GROUP, PERSPECTIVES (1987)); see also id. at 49 (noting that General Motors made

objectively inferior cars for roughly two decades without experiencing what should have been a
catastrophic loss of market share).
144 Id; see also Gilles Laurent, Jean-Noel Kapferer & Francoise Roussel, The Underlying
Structure of Brand Awareness Scores, 14 MARKETING SC. G170, G177 (1995) (noting the
barriers that existing brands with strong brand awareness pose to establishing awareness of a new
brand in the existing brands' product category).

145 For the classic exposition of the principles and tools of expected utility theory, see
generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC

BEHAVIOR 1-45 (3d ed. 1953). For a modem summary, see Hanson & Kysar, supra note 128, at
640-43.
146 This point can perhaps best be demonstrated with an example. Assume a consumer is
accustomed to purchasing a particular brand of product for $120 per unit, and that the closest
substitute is an unfamiliar product that sells for $100 per unit. Under certain conditions, the
consumer would rationally continue to purchase the familiar product even if the unfamiliar one is
objectively superior along the dimensions the consumer values. To see how this might be the
case, suppose that the consumer believes that consuming the familiar product will generate $125
in utility with certainty and that consuming the unfamiliar product has a 60% probability of
generating $150 in utility but a 40% chance of generating only $30 in utility. Under these
circumstances, purchasing the familiar product is the consumer's best option. To see why, note
that the expected value of the unfamiliar product is the probability of each outcome multiplied by
the value to the consumer of that outcome, here: (0.6 x $150) + (0.4 x $30) = $90 + $12 = $102.
Thus, even though the consumer believes that it is more likely than not that the unfamiliar
product is superior to the familiar product, her uncertainty in that belief would lead her to
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This explanation for brand loyalty is admittedly consistent with the
search-costs model-but only because both depend on the same
assumptions about consumer behavior. One such assumption is that
consumers approach the calculation of expected utility in conditions of
uncertainty rationally, by reference to absolute values, and with a
reasonable degree of accuracy. Yet another is the factual assumption
discussed above,147 that consumers modify their subjective beliefs to
accurately reflect new information. But empirical study of human
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty suggests that both of
these assumptions are wrong, and they are wrong for similar reasons.
First, the assumption that most individuals approach risky choice
tasks as rational and roughly accurate utility-maximizers is contradicted
by empirical research. The body of research conducted under the aegis
of "prospect theory" has established various predictable biases-regular
departures from the rational-behavior predictions of expected utility
theory-in such choice tasks.148 For example, individuals' attitudes
toward risky prospects are strongly influenced by their frame of
reference: In general, people are far more eager to avoid losses than
they are to acquire gains,1 49 and they evaluate risks of gain and loss not
in absolute terms, but in relative terms, by reference to their current
position at the time of choice.' 50 In the consumer context, these
tendencies lead consumers considering whether to switch from a
rationally calculate the net benefit to her of purchasing the unfamiliar product at only $2 ($102
less the $100 purchase price), while the net benefit of purchasing the familiar product would be
$5 ($125 less the $120 purchase price). This will be true even if the unfamiliar product actually
does have qualities that the consumer would value at $150-that is, even if it is objectively
superior to the familiar product. And note that it is also true despite the fact that the unfamiliar
product is not only objectively superior to the familiar one, but is offered for sale at a
significantly lower price. All else being equal, in order to induce the consumer to switch, the
manufacturer of the unfamiliar product would have to price its product at no more than $97 ($102
- $5), even if its product is objectively superior to its competitor's $120 product. Alternatively,
the manufacturer of the unfamiliar product might seek to reduce the consumer's uncertainty, for
example through informative advertising, if this were a cost-effective way of altering the
consumer's expected value calculation under the circumstances.
147 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
148 An important collection of research in prospect theory, including its seminal texts and more
recent applications, is CHOICES, VALUES, & FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds.,
2000) [hereinafter CHOICES]. Again, this research owes its genesis to the insights of Herbert
Simon, who pointed out the unreasonable demands expected utility theory made of the cognitive
capacities of the human organism. See Simon, Rational Choice, supra note 128, at 101
("Because of the psychological limits of the organism (particularly with respect to computational
and predictive ability), actual human rationality-striving can at best be an extremely crude and
simplified approximation to the kind of global rationality that is implied, for example, by gametheoretical models."). See generally supra note 128 and sources cited therein.
149 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under

Risk, in CHOICES, supranote 148, at 17, 22-23.
150 See generally Ian Bateman et al., A Test of the Theory of Reference-Dependent
Preferences, in CHOICES, supra note 148, at 180.
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familiar brand to an unfamiliar one to underweight the prospect that the
unfamiliar brand will be as good as or better than the familiar one and
overweight the prospect that the unfamiliar brand will be inferior to the
familiar brand.' 5 More colloquially, even if a bird in the hand were
rationally worth two in the bush, the typical consumer might
subjectively value it at three or four.152
Second and most importantly, the central assumption of the searchcosts model and of signaling theory-that consumers will change their
subjective beliefs and preferences to accurately reflect newly learned
objective facts-is not a fair description of actual consumer behavior
and cognition. 53 To the contrary, across a wide range of experience
(including consumer experience), individuals have been shown to do
precisely the opposite: We try to interpret new evidence as being
consistent with our pre-existing beliefs. Where this fails, we often
discount the new evidence as not credible or not important, minimizing
shifts in our overall preferences and choice behaviors.1 54 Where the
151 See generally Bruce G.S. Hardie, Eric J. Johnson & Peter S. Fader, Modeling Loss
Aversion and Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice, 12 MARKETING SCI. 378 (1993)

(building and empirically validating a model of interbrand choice in the orange juice market,
demonstrating reference effects with respect to the last brand purchased, and finding loss aversion
to be quite strong with respect to quality and less strong but still relevant with respect to price).
Cf Gal Zauberman, The Intertemporal Dynamics of Consumer Lock-In, 30 J. CONSUMER RES.

405 (2003) (modeling brand loyalty as a consequence of another boundedly rational feature of
consumer psychology: the underweighting of temporally remote future events and consumer
unawareness of this underweighting, which leads consumers to underestimate potential future
switching costs when making brand choices in the present).
152 This bias obtains even where the consumer has not actually purchased the brand, but
merely has been primed with an opportunity to purchase the brand-the acquisition of a coupon.
See generally Sankar Sen & Eric J. Johnson, Mere Possession Effects Without Possession in

Consumer Choice, 24 J.CONSUMER RES. 105 (1997) (reviewing empirical research on consumer
bias in favor of previously purchased brands and extending the findings to a coupon experiment).
153 Stephen J. Hoch & John Deighton, Managing What Consumers Learn from Experience, 53

J. MARKETING 1, 1 (1989) ("Learning from self-generated experience with a product or service is
not a simple process of discovering objective truth. It is, to a greater or lesser extent, open to
influence and the consumer's confidence in the objectivity of such learning can be illusory.").
For a review of the literature similar to the one that follows, see Assaf, supra note 117. Professor
Assaf uses this empirical evidence to argue for an understanding of brands as "totemic" or
"sacred" as those concepts are understood in anthropology, while my review of the literature
applies the same evidence within the more traditional economic model of trademarks, though our
normative conclusions regarding trademark policy share some common points. Compare id at
55-64, with infra Part III.
154 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 128, at 646-54. See generally Rohini Ahluwalia,
Examination of Psychological Processes Underlying Resistance to Persuasion, 27 J. CONSUMER

RES. 217 (2000) (examining the psychological processes that generate this behavior, including
biased assessment of attitude-inconsistent information, decreased weighting in evaluative
processes of attributes to which such information is relevant, and resistance to "spillover"
inferences as to other attributes); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation Bias in
the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 5 (1996) (same, but

focusing on the tendency to spend more time and effort attempting to refute arguments
incompatible with prior beliefs than compatible arguments); William Samuelson & Richard
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pre-existing belief is based on a decision that we have already made
(such as the decision to purchase a particular brand), this confirmation
bias is particularly strong.s55 This behavior has been observed in the
context of political beliefs, 156 scientific beliefs,157 and, most relevant for
present purposes, consumer beliefs. 158
Experimental studies consistently show that consumer familiarity
with a brand positively influences their assessment of that brand during
consumption. Generally, we are not able to distinguish among
comparable competing products in blind trials, but we (erroneously)
fancy ourselves connoisseurs where brand labels are available to guide
our evaluation. 159 Where a brand label is visible during sampling, we
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (reviewing

various examples of decision-making that favors prior decisions and theories to explain the
phenomenon).
155 See, e.g., Joel B. Cohen & Michael J. Houston, Cognitive Consequences ofBrand Loyalty,

9 J.MARKETING RES. 97, 99 (1972) ("[Tlhe control group found only trivial differences between
Colgate and Crest in [a variety of product attributes]. Those loyal to one or the other, however,
saw rather substantial differences, always in the direction that would justify their choices."); Hoch
& Deighton, supra note 153, at 6 ("Consumers tend to avoid situations in which they might
receive unfavorable feedback about chosen alternatives and favorable feedback about rejected
alternatives; instead they often attempt to 'confirm a good buy."' (citing Dieter Frey & Marita
Rosch, Information Seeking After Decisions: The Roles of Novelty of Information and Decision
Reversibility, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 91 (1984))); cf ROBERT B. CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 71-74, 91-95 (2000) (arguing that extraction of a small

commitment up front allows a manipulator to extract significant concessions going forward due
to the subject's desire to act in a manner consistent with past choices).
156 See generally, e.g., Edwards & Smith, supra note 154 (finding a bias in favor of prior
beliefs on a variety of arguments regarding issues of public policy); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross &
Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation andAttitude Polarization:The Effects of PriorTheories on

Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979) (finding
views on deterrent effects of capital punishment insensitive to empirical evidence); Brendan
Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions (Apr.
22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/-bnyhan/
nyhan-reifler.pdf (finding that voters tend to try to fit new information into their preexisting
ideological views and not only discount information inconsistent with those views but actually
rebel against such information, hewing to their original views even more strongly than before
encountering the new information).
157 See generally Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments
ofEvidence Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993).
158 See, e.g., William Boulding, Ajay Kalra & Richard Staelin, The Quality Double Whammy,

18 MARKETING SCI. 463 (1999) (finding that pre-existing consumer beliefs about service quality
continue to influence quality judgments following direct experience of the service, both because
consumers consider quality cumulatively and because prior beliefs influence perceptions of the
direct experience).
159 See generally, e.g., Ralph I. Allison & Kenneth P. Uhl, Influence of Beer Brand
Identificationon Taste Perception, 1 J. MARKETING RES. 36 (1964) (taste tests of beer by regular
beer drinkers). But see Joandrea Hoegg & Joseph W. Alba, Taste Perception:More than Meets

the Tongue, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 490 (2007) (finding that consumers in blind tests are able to
distinguish somewhat between premium and store-brand orange juice by taste); G.A. Mauser,
Allison & Uhl Revisited: The Effects of Taste and BrandName on Perceptionsand Preferences, 6
ADVANCES INCONSUMER RES. 161, 162-65 (1979) (finding the Allison & Uhl results to be less

clear in a repeated experiment). The use of taste tests for purposes of comparative advertising in
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tend to prefer the products bearing familiar labels to others--even if the
actual products are identical or, worse, if the familiar label has been
deceptively applied to an objectively inferior product.160 Importantly,
this phenomenon is not limited to overall preference or even to
subjective images. Familiarity actually influences our experience of
objective product attributes during or after consumption: When we are
familiar with the label on the package, beer has more body and aroma,
tissues feel softer, toothpaste leaves our breath fresher and our teeth
whiter. 161
This effect of familiarity on product evaluation applies not only to
familiarity with the brand, but to familiarity with factual claims
regarding the brandedproduct's attributes. When a marketer makes a
factual claim in advertising, that claim is more likely to be believed and
the attribute more likely to be favorably evaluated after product trial
than it would be absent the advertising.162 Mere repetition of such
claims increases belief in their truth and makes them even more
resistant to disconfirmation-indeed, efforts at disconfirmation can

the cola industry has provided some of the clearest examples of the effects of brand labels on
evaluation of product trials. Different cola brands are essentially indistinguishable in a blind taste
test. J.W. Bowles, Jr. & N.H. Pronko, Identification of Cola Beverages: I. A FurtherStudy, 32 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 559, 564 (1948) ("Within the limits of the present experiment, the findings
permit the generalization that when subjects are asked to discriminate and identify Cola drinks,
they might do just as well by drawing the names of those beverages out of a hat."). But labeling
the products being sampled convinces consumers otherwise: A Coke drinker will express a clear
preference for Pepsi when poured out of a Coke bottle. Mary E. Woolfolk, William Castellan &
Charles I. Brooks, Pepsi Versus Coke: Labels, Not Tastes, Prevail,52 PSYCHOL. REP. 185, 186
(1983).
160 Hoyer & Brown, supra note 107, at 146-48 (finding consumers preferred generic peanut
butter that had been rated consistently lower in a blind taste test when it was served out of a jar
bearing a national brand label); accord Joandrea Hoegg & Joseph W. Alba, Taste Perception:
More than Meets the Tongue, 33 J.CONSUMER RES. 490, 496-97 (2007) (finding that consumers
prefer the taste of orange juice labeled with a national brand two-to-one over juice labeled with a
store-brand, even though both labels were applied to the same national-brand juice).
161 Allison & Uhl, supra note 158, at 38-39 (finding labels influenced consumer perceptions of
some, though not all, specific characteristics of beer); Srinivasan & Till, supra note 116, at 42125 (finding similar results for certain characteristics of fruit cocktail and facial tissue); cf Cohen
& Houston, supra note 155, at 98-99 (finding that regular purchasers of two national brands of
toothpaste rated their preferred brand higher on a variety of attributes than alternative brands,
while regular purchasers of other brands rated the two national brands as equivalent on those
attributes).
162 See generally Ryan S. Elder & Aradhna Krishna, The Effects of Advertising Copy on
Sensory Thoughts and Perceived Taste, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 748, 749-53 (2010); Stephen J.
Hoch & Young-Won Ha, Consumer Learning: Advertising and the Ambiguity of Product
Experience, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 221 (1986). But see Jerry C. Olson & Philip A. Dover,
Cognitive Effects ofDeceptive Advertising, 15 J.MARKETING RES. 29, 31-37 (1978) (finding that
advertising claiming that a bitter coffee brand was not bitter was believed by consumers prior to
product trial, and that although product trial dispelled the belief, consumers exposed to the ad
retained a stronger intention to purchase the coffee than consumers who had not seen the ad).
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actually entrench such mistaken beliefs. 163 The expectations created by
pre-consumption product attribute claims can be powerful enough to
reverse the preferences observed in comparative product trials.164 And
just as familiarity biases our evaluation of our own sensory experiences,
it similarly biases our evaluation of other potentially disconfirmatory
product information such as media publicity and third-party
evaluations. 165
In short, branding biases consumers. It leads us to hold subjective
beliefs as to objectively knowable facts that may diverge from objective
data and yet be resistant to influence by exposure to such data, and it
influences our preferences and choice behaviors accordingly. This
phenomenon, which I will refer to as "brand bias," has been observed
across a range of consumer experience levels,166 across diverse
regularly purchased consumer product categories, 167 and even across
cultures. 168 Indeed, brand bias appears to be hard-wired into our brains:
We use different neurons to make sense out of the experience of
drinking from a cup labeled "Coke" than we do drinking the same liquid
from an unlabeled cup.1 69 But brand bias operates below the level of
163 See Sheff, supra note 111, at 161-62, and sources cited therein (reviewing the cognitive
psychology literature on this "illusory truth effect" in the context of analyzing political campaign
communications).
164 Leonard Lee, Shane Frederick & Dan Ariely, Try It, You'll Like It: The Influence of
Expectation, Consumption, and Revelation on Preferences for Beer, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1054

(2006).
165 See generally Rohini Ahluwalia, Robert E. Burnkrant & H. Rao Unnava, Consumer
Response to Negative Publicity: The Moderating Role of Commitment, 37 J. MARKETING RES.

203 (2000); J. Edward Russo, Victoria Husted Medvec & Margaret G. Meloy, The Distortionof
Information DuringDecisions, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 102

(1996). Importantly, producers can create a counteracting pull on such disconfirmatory thirdparty messages by post-consumption advertising that influences consumers to remember the
sensory experience of past consumption more positively than they actually experienced it, further
reducing the influence of direct experience on beliefs and preferences. See generally Kathryn A.
Braun, Postexperience Advertising Effects on Consumer Memory, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 319

(1999).
166 Compare, e.g., Allison & Uhl, supra note 157 (experienced beer drinkers), with Hoyer &
Brown, supranote 107 (subjects had never purchased peanut butter for themselves).
167 See generally, e.g., Allison & Uhl, supra note 157 (beer); Hoyer & Brown, supra note 107
(peanut butter); Siew Meng Leong, Consumer Decision Making for Common, Repeat-Purchase
Products: A Dual Replication, 2 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 193 (1993) (laundry detergent and

shampoo); Macdonald & Sharp, supra note 107 (soft drinks); Srinivasan & Till, supra note 116
(fruit cocktail and facial tissue); Woolfolk, Castellan & Brooks, supra note 159 (cola).
168 See generally, e.g., Macdonald & Sharp, supra note 107 (Australian test population);
Leong, supra note 167 (Singaporean test population).
169 Samuel M. McClure et al., Neural Correlates of Behavioral Preference for Culturally

FamiliarDrinks, 44 NEURON 379, 383 (2004) ("When judgments are based solely on sensory
information [i.e., in a blind taste test), relative activity in the [ventromedial prefrontal cortex, or
VMPFC,] predicts people's preferences. [However,] brand knowledge . .. biases preference
decisions and recruits the hippocampus, [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex or] DLPFC, and
midbrain."); Michael Koenigs & Daniel Tranel, Prefrontal Cortex Damage Abolishes BrandCued Changes in Cola Preference, 3 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1, 3-4
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awareness. Even if we are told we have the tendency to let prior
information influence our assessment of new experience, we appear to
be unable to detect ourselves doing so.o70 In other words, brand bias is
not only pervasive, it is something we are simply not equipped to
correct for ourselves. As a result, brand beliefs, preferences, and
choices are "sticky" to an extent that the search-costs model cannot
account for.
Some important caveats are in order. Of course, direct experience
can and does generate changed attitudes and beliefs that affect consumer
loyalty and choice behaviors going forward-particularly where such
experience is starkly inconsistent with expectations.'17 Rather than a
deterministic law of cognition, brand bias can best be understood as a
kind of friction or drag on the movement of consumer beliefs and
preferences in response to new information.172 The magnitude of this
resistance is not constant; it depends on a variety of variables. Some of
these variables derive from the nature of the product: Is it an
inexpensive, low-involvement, frequently purchased product with few
relevant attributes, or is it a more complex, expensive, durable
product? 173 Are the relevant attributes of the product susceptible to
definitive measurement through consumption, or are they more
ambiguous or difficult for a non-expert to assess? 74 Other variables
may depend on the choice environment, particularly the time pressure
under which choices are made and the attention paid by consumers to
the choice task.17 5 In the final analysis, brand bias is only one of many
factors playing a role in the complex phenomena of consumer choice.
The complexity of consumer choice, as demonstrated by the
empirical evidence discussed in this Part, helps to explain why the
(2008) (showing that individuals with damage to the VMPFC do not show similar bias in
response to brand labels and confirming McClure et al.'s conclusion that "normal brand
preference is the product of factors unrelated to the taste of the soft drink").
170 J. Edward Russo, Kurt A. Carlson & Margaret G. Meloy, Choosing an InferiorAlternative,
17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 899, 901-03 (2006).
171 See generally, e.g., Vikas Mittal, William T. Ross, Jr. & Patrick M. Baldasare, The
Asymmetric Impact of Negative and Positive Attribute-Level Performanceon OverallSatisfaction
and Repurchase Intentions, 62 J. MARKETING 33 (1998); see also, e.g., Olson & Dover, supra

note 162, at 31-37.
172 Especially illustrative of this point is Jerry C. Olson & Philip A. Dover, Disconfirmationof
Consumer Expectations Through Product Trial,64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 179, 184-86 (1979).
173 See, e.g., Gilbert A. Churchill, Jr. & Carol Surprenant, An Investigation into the
Determinantsof Customer Satisfaction, 19 J. MARKETING REs. 491, 502-03 (1982).
174 See generally Young-Won Ha & Stephen J. Hoch, Ambiguity, ProcessingStrategy, and
Advertising-Evidence Interactions, 16 J. CONSUMER REs. 354 (1989); Srinivasan & Till, supra

note 116.
175 See generally, e.g., Tilmann Betsch et al., When Prior Knowledge Overrules New
Evidence: Adaptive Use ofDecision Strategies and the Role of Behavioral Routines, 58 SWISS J.

PSYCHOL. 151 (1990); see also Elder & Krishna, supra note 162, at 753-55; Sheff, supra note 77,
at 370-71.
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various elements of brand equity do not appear to make consistent
contributions to brand value across product categories or between
products and services. 176 Although the effects of brands on consumer
choice are not strictly rational or deterministic, they are not susceptible
to theoretical determination either. To the contrary, the degree to which
a consumer's decision-making will diverge from the predictions of
theoretical models premised on rational behavior is an intensely
context-dependent question, which can only be determined
empirically. 177 This empirical contingency of brand bias suggests a
more complex role for law than the search-costs model can conceive of.
The next Part will illustrate how the law manages this complexity.
III.

BRAND BIAS, OPPORTUNISTIC PRODUCERS, AND THE
COSTS OF CONSUMER MARKETS

A.

The DangersofBrand Bias and the
Complicity of TrademarkDoctrine

Brand bias gives producers a strong incentive to cultivate
familiarity with their brands (and with favorable attribute claims
regarding their brands) in the minds of consumers, both upon the launch
of a product (to generate awareness-based preference) and over time (to
maintain awareness and cultivate loyalty). The most obvious means to
generate familiarity is advertising-even uninformative advertising. Of
course, cultivation of familiarity could go hand-in-hand with other
elements of brand equity-making high-quality products to increase
perceived quality, or disseminating truthful, informative (or even
persuasive) advertising to strengthen accurate brand associations, for
example. The familiarity-based incentive to advertise does not imply
that familiarizing advertising will always deceive or otherwise lead to
results inconsistent with the search-costs model's predictions-as the
empirical signaling literature makes plain. 178 Indeed, our preference for
and deference to the familiar are so powerful precisely because
familiarity so often correlates to the objective facts that we infer from
it. 179

176 See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
177 See Bar-Gill,supra note 136, at 754-65.

178 See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
179 GIGERENZER, supra note 129, at 128-29 ("Relying on brand-name recognition is

reasonable when firms first increase product quality, and increased quality subsequently increases
name recognition, by word of mouth or the media."); Barebara Kiviat, Why We Buy the Products
We Buy, TIME, Aug. 27, 2007, at 50 ("A flurry of new research is shedding light on people's
tendency-when presented with a known object and an unknown one-to assign more value to
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But the fact that consumers appear to have trouble learning from
experiences in which familiarity does not serve as a good predictor of
experience opens the door to strategic behavior by brand owners. There
is no a priori reason why familiarity-based responses and evidencebased responses to a brand must be consistent-again, the signaling
literature demonstrates that sometimes they are not.o80 And because
familiarity-based beliefs and preferences are resistant to disconfirmation
by objective evidence, any divergence between the two can be exploited
by strategic brand owners in a kind of psychological arbitrage.' 8' To
take the most straightforward scenario, a brand owner might deploy
purely noninformative advertising to generate consumer beliefs based
on a sense of familiarity, even if those beliefs were inconsistent with the
qualities of the brand owner's product.182 More perniciously, the brand
owner might assert a false attribute claim in advertising for his products,
generating similar results.183 In either case, the advertising could
influence the consumer's interpretation of all subsequently encountered
information about the branded product (including the experience of
consumption itself),184 causing her to more favorably evaluate the
product than she would have otherwise and potentially leading her to
make purchase decisions she would not have made were she basing her
decisions on a simple mapping of available information to her own
preferences. In other words, mere exposure of a consumer to a brand,
or mere assertion of an unsupported attribute claim, can act as a foot in
the door to the consumer's mind, invoking brand bias and inducing
behavior that a rational consumer would avoid.
Brand owners know this, and indeed much of marketing research is
devoted to the task of managing consumer knowledge and learning so as

the thing they've heard of, even if they don't know anything else about it. It's easy to imagine
the evolutionary roots of a go-with-what-you-know principle-avoiding poisonous plants, say
.... ); see Goldstein & Gigerenzer, supra note 110, at 78 (discussing the "ecological rationality"
criterion for application of the recognition heuristic).
180 See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
181 See generally Hoch & Deighton, supra note 153 (discussing techniques marketers can use
to limit and manipulate what consumers learn about products from direct experience); cf
Matthew G. Nagler, Rather Bait Than Switch: Deceptive Advertising with Bounded Consumer

Rationality, 51 J. PUB. ECON. 359 (1993) (demonstrating theoretically that bounded rationality
among consumers gives producers an incentive to advertise deceptively).
182 See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text; see also Gigerenzer, supra note 129, at
128-29 ("Non-informative advertisement, however, shortcuts this process. Firms spend huge
sums of money to directly increase the recognition of their brand name in the media .... In this
case, the correlation between quality and media presence might be nil .... Firms that spend their
money on buying space in your recognition memory already know this.... Taken to the
extreme, being recognized becomes the goal in itself."). On the effects of branding on the
experience of consuming cola beverages, see supra notes 159, 169 and sources cited therein.
183 See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
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to maximize value for brand owners.185 Brand bias thus makes at least
some advertising and other marketing efforts appear less like producers'
assumption of consumers' costs of gathering needed information-as
the search-costs model posits-and more like an exercise in rentseeking.186 Where such efforts are neither informative nor persuasive,
they would not seem to generate any value for consumers. Yet these
efforts can, under certain circumstances, increase brand equity by
inducing consumers to buy more of the producer's products or pay more
for those products than they otherwise would. Such brand-building
efforts, rather than increasing social welfare (as would at least arguably
be the case for informative and persuasive activities), serve only to
transfer surplus value from consumers to producers-that is, to generate
economic rents.187 Efforts to induce such transfers, in turn, waste
resources and decrease social welfare.' 88 The HeadOn campaign
discussed in the Introduction to this Article-in which mere repetition
of a brand name in advertising generated multimillion-dollar sales of a
placebo to treat a condition for which numerous inexpensive and more
efficacious treatments were readily available 189-is a prime example of
the successful use of such a strategy.
Herein lies the challenge of brand bias to the search-costs model.
Trademarks do reduce one kind of transactions cost-search costs-but
as a byproduct they create another kind of transactions cost-brand
bias. The conclusion that trademark protection is welfare-increasing is
only tenable in commercial contexts where the net effect of such
protection on transactions costs is negative: where the welfareincreasing effects of lowered search costs outweigh the welfaredecreasing effects of brand bias. 190 But the model provides no tools to

185 See generally Hoch & Deighton, supra note 153.
186 See CIALDINI, supra note 155, at 9-11 ("[Mjost of us know very little about our automatic

behavior patterns .... [T]hey make us terribly vulnerable to anyone who does know how they
work .... We too have profiteers who mimic trigger features for our own brand of automatic
responding .... [E]ach such principle [of automated response] is a detectable and ready weapon
... of automatic influence.").
187 See generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.

EcoN. J. 224 (1967) (pointing out that resources expended by producers to capture surplus
economic value from consumers through an ability to charge supracompetitive prices will
constitute a significant loss of social welfare, beyond the mere loss of surplus attributable to the
deadweight loss of the supracompetitive price).
188 See, e.g., Anne 0. Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
EcoN. REv. 291 (1974) (arguing that competition over economic rents results in welfare losses in
the amount of the value of the rents themselves); cf Economides, supra note 17, at 535
(conceding that although persuasive advertising is not completely wasteful, waste is involved in
tying the persuasive images to the advertised product in the minds of consumers).
189 See supra notes 2-15 and accompanying text.
190 Whether the persuasive effects of branding should be considered welfare-increasing or
welfare-decreasing is, as discussed above, a normative question on which reasonable minds may
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determine whether that condition will be satisfied in a given trademark
case because it assumes that brand bias does not exist.' 9 ' And
trademark doctrine, heavily informed by the search-costs model, reflects
similar assumptions.
For example, the law of secondary meaning-the key test for
establishing trademark rights in a mark that is not inherently
distinctive' 92-largely reflects the search-costs model's assumptions.
For purposes of establishing secondary meaning, more advertising is
generally better.193 Furthermore, although most thoughtful courts
generally look for some indication that heavy advertising has actually
caused consumers to associate the mark with a particular product,194
they typically cite the benefits of such associations without discussing
their costs. 195 This influence of the search-costs model's assumptions
extends beyond the criteria for establishing trademark rights. The heavy
differ. See supra Part II.A. . Taking the view most favorable to the search-costs model, this
Article assumes that persuasion increases welfare.
191 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
192 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992)

("The general rule

regarding distinctiveness is clear: an identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being
protected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through
secondary meaning." (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (1995))).
193 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION 15:51 ("The logical inference

goes thus: The seller spent a large amount of money on advertising. The larger the amount spent,
the greater the exposure of buyers to this symbol as a trademark: The greater the exposure, the
greater the likelihood that buyers will associate this symbol with one seller in a trademark
sense."); id. at n. 1 (collecting cases).
194 See, e.g., Platinum Home Mortg. Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 729
(7th Cir. 1998) ("Evidence of advertising and sales is entirely circumstantial, and that evidence
does not necessarily indicate that consumers associate a mark with a particular source,
particularly when the advertisements and promotions do not specifically emphasize the mark.");
Co-Rect Prods., Inc. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1332 (8th Cir. 1985)
("Although it is true that advertising is a relevant factor in determining whether a mark has
acquired a secondary meaning, it is the effect of such advertising that is important, not its extent.
To be effective in this respect, the advertising must cause the public to equate the mark with the
source of the product." (internal citation omitted)). Indeed, some courts in the early days of the
modem advertising era demonstrated a fairly sophisticated view of the psychological effects of
marketing. See, e.g., Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774, 775 (7th
Cir. 1927) ("While the human mind drops and forgets much that it hears and sees, yet it holds fast
to some word, place, name, sign, or symbol contained in an advertisement, through which some
human need has been supplied, and that recollection is carried by the people into times and places
far removed from the times and places of the publication .... The spread of an advertisement
among people is like ever-spreading ripples from a pebble thrown into still water. The ripples go
out and out in an ever-increasing circle from a common center, long after the pebble is lost to
sight, and, although the ripples become fainter and fainter, the originating center can always be
found, until the water's surface is again at rest.").
195 See, e.g., Northam Warren, 18 F.2d at 775 ("Throwing pebbles into water is child's play,
but knowledge of a trade-mark, through advertising and as carried by the people, is an important,
valuable business asset, gained at much expense. It is a right which the one who creates it may
say not be obstructed or confused by unfair methods or practices of competitors, so long as it
continues to carry force, although the force may be far-spent and the recollection of the origin
dimmed.").
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advertiser not only wins himself protection; he also has a stronger case
for infringement or dilution, insofar as advertising is probative of mark
strengthl 96 and fame.197
Similarly, most of the likelihood-of-confusion tests used by the
circuit courts of appeals to decide trademark infringement cases include
a factor addressing the degree of care exercised by consumers in making
their purchase decisions.1 98 It seems likely that this factor would
correlate inversely with the tendency of consumers to rely on awareness
and loyalty in making purchase decisions,199 and thus that courts could
use this factor to identify potentially inefficient trademark uses. But in
fact, courts do precisely the opposite. Low degrees of consumer care,
rather than suggesting a high likelihood of brand bias and thus a weaker
argument for trademark enforcement, are held to indicate a high
likelihood of consumer confusion and thus weigh in favor of a mark
owner's claim of infringement. 200
A similar dynamic is evident with respect to another likelihood-ofconfusion factor: product quality. Some circuits also allow for a
comparison of the quality of the brand owner's products to the quality
of the accused maker's products. 201 Again, such an inquiry might give
courts an opportunity to decline trademark enforcement in instances
where the brand premium enjoyed by the brand owner exceeds any
reasonable measure of the marginal economic value of the information
provided by the brand. But again, courts do the opposite: Similarity in
the quality of the plaintiffs and defendant's products is held to increase
196 See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 1988)
("Marks may be strengthened by extensive advertising. .. ."); cf Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio
Products, Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (advertising is relevant to the "fame" factor
in the likelihood of confusion analysis conducted in registration proceedings).
197 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(i) (2006) (listing magnitude of advertising as a factor in
determining whether a mark has the requisite fame to support a dilution claim).
198 Bos. Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989) (classes of prospective
purchasers); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(sophistication of buyers); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (price
of the goods and other factors indicative of expected consumer care and attention at point-ofsale); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir. 1997) (sophistication
of buyers); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986) (degree of care
exercised by potential purchasers); Frisch's Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th
Cir. 1982) (likely degree of purchaser care); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th
Cir. 1980) (degree of purchaser care in light of the kind, cost, and conditions of purchase of the
product); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (type of goods and
the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser); Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748
F.2d 556, 558 n.5 (10th Cir. 1984) (likely degree of purchaser care).
199 See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
200 See, e.g., W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 575-576 (2d Cir. 1993)
("Generally, purchasers of small items ... are considered casual purchasers prone to impulse
buying ... [, while rietailers are assumed to be more sophisticated buyers and thus less prone to
confusion." (internal citations omitted)).
201 Polaroid,287 F.2d at 495; Shakespeare, 110 F.3d at 242.
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the likelihood of confusion and thus provide an argument in favor of
liability. 202 In sum, the features of trademark doctrine that might be
used to identify and ameliorate brand bias instead reflect the assumption
that brand bias is either nonexistent or irrelevant.
The foregoing discussion suggests that judges in ordinary
trademark infringement cases have tools at their disposal to seek out and
guard against brand bias. Potential examples might include a reduced
reliance on advertising as evidence, a heightened burden of persuasion
on trademark plaintiffs in low-involvement purchase contexts, or a
stinginess with remedies where the quality of the defendant's product is
indistinguishable from that of the plaintiffs product. To be sure, a
sensitivity to these issues would be a welcome innovation in trademark
doctrine. However, the fact that trademark doctrine conspicuously
ignores brand bias does not mean that it is always wrong to do so.
Case-by-case analysis to seek out and correct brand bias would be
costly and might in many cases be counterproductive. 203 Just as the
legal tests discussed above could be used to identify rent-seeking by
brand owners cultivating brand bias, they are also helpful in identifying
those aspects of human cognition that allow trademark protection to
lower search costs in the first place, and whether one or the other effect
dominates in a particular instance is an empirical question. 204 In such a
factually complex situation, there is a strong argument that
administrative costs and errors on the margins could overwhelm any
efficiency gains that might be generated by tasking courts with
identifying and ameliorating brand bias on a case-by-case basis. 205
Thus, despite the fact that trademark protection both increases and
decreases transactions costs (through brand bias and lowered search
costs, respectively), case-by-case adjudication, which itself creates

202 See, e.g., Morningside Group Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133,
142 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Products of equal quality may tend to create confusion as to source because
of that very similarity of quality." (citation omitted)).
203 See supra notes 130-37 and sources cited therein.
204 I have previously argued that the various tests for trademark liability reflect exactly such a
concern. Sheff, supra note 77; see also Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 110, at 378, 380 ("Consumer choices are
often between products that conjure up strong associations due to effective advertising or market
longevity and products whose value can be justified analytically. Choosing between brand
names, with which we have had long experience, and generic products, which sometimes have
identical ingredients and a lower price, has this character.").
205 Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2102,
2123-25 (2004); cf Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1, 15 (1992). The
prevalence of all-or-nothing injunctive relief in trademark cases only increases the costs of such
judicial error. 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30.1.
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significant enforcement costs, may be ill-suited to identify and
ameliorate such bias. 206
This deficiency in trademark law does not imply that brand bias
must simply be tolerated. Rather, it suggests that weapons against
brand bias, if they are deemed necessary, should be sought outside of
trademark doctrine, in mechanisms that can effectively mitigate such
bias (and potentially supplement or supplant the search-costs-lowering
function of brands) without themselves generating unduly high
enforcement costs. Given the imprecision of regimes that apply
indiscriminately to all commercial activities (such as trademark law)
and the high social costs that would result from attempting to improve
their precision on a case-by-case basis, we would expect the most
effective weapons against brand bias to be pitched at an intermediate
level-targeting particular industries where the costs of brand bias
outweigh the benefits of lowered search costs from branding. And in
fact, various bodies of law appear to be directed to precisely this end.
B.

CounteractingBrandBias: Market Solutions and
Legal Interventions

1.

Debiasing Through Competition:
When to Trust the Market

The first and most obvious weapon against brand bias is
competition. The success of a brand-bias marketing strategy in
generating a net economic gain for the producer who deploys it is far
from assured. As noted above, the relative degree of influence on a
given consumer's decisions of the informative, persuasive, and biasing
effects of brands (represented by the various elements of brand equity)
is not constant across all areas of consumer experience. 207 Thus, we
would surmise that in some industries, market forces alone will
206 It is worth noting that Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have argued that in the
context of patent law, case-by-case adjudication is the best way to achieve industry-specific
tailoring of the scope of patent rights, in the form of rules of decision that have differential impact
on particular industries operating under the same statutory framework. See generally DAN L.
BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
It is doubtful whether such an approach could be equally effective in trademark law, where
inefficiencies result from strategic producer exploitation of consumers' bounded rationality rather
than from strategic behavior of firms exploiting the legal system as a means to hobble their
competitors. Rather, the dynamic seen in patent law is the type of cautionary tale typically
invoked in opposition to interventions targeting the effects of bounded rationality. Cf., e.g.,
Epstein, Neoclassical Economics, supra note 133, at 807 ("[P]owerful political forces, with
excellent private knowledge, often turn regulation to their own parochial ends by creating barriers
to entry that block or hamper the emergence of strong competitive markets.").
207 See supra notes 68-76, 173-75 and accompanying text.
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minimize divergences between objective and subjective measures of
relevant product attributes by rewarding producers whose products
objectively meet the subjective expectations created by their marketing
and punishing producers who attempt to profit from brand bias. 208 In
such markets, legal intervention will simply generate administrative
costs without providing significant benefits and should be avoided. In
other markets, however, producers who leverage brand bias through
marketing activities could find themselves not only thriving, but also at
a competitive advantage to other producers who make costly
investments in an effort to inform consumers or provide higher
quality. 209 In this circumstance, some form of intervention will be
needed to avoid market failure. 210
As the previous Parts made clear, whether brand bias outweighs
the benefits of lower search costs in a particular market is an empirical
question, and generalizations should be made with great care. 211
Despite this caveat, one promising generalization has been identified in
economic analyses of false advertising law: The need for legal
intervention is greater where relevant product characteristics are
difficult for consumers to unambiguously measure.
[T]he characteristics of goods and services form a continuum, from
those in which it is very easy to detect the truth or falsity of
208 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text; see also George Akerlof, The Marketfor
"Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970)

("Consider a market in which goods are sold honestly or dishonestly; quality may be represented,
or it may be misrepresented. The purchaser's problem, of course, is to identify quality. The
presence of people in the market who are willing to offer inferior goods tends to drive the market
out of existence-as in the case of our automobile 'lemons.' It is this possibility that represents
the major costs of dishonesty-for dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the
market.").
210 Between these two extremes, there is likely a broad gray area in which brand bias eats
away at the informational and persuasive value of trademarks, without overwhelming it. In such
markets, balancing the benefits of trademark protection and complementary legal intervention
against the combined costs of brand bias and enforcement of the complementary regime becomes
much more complicated and uncertain. This subpart will focus on the less complex scenario in
which brand bias overwhelms search-cost reduction, as this scenario provides the most obviousalbeit not the exclusive-argument for legal intervention.
211 See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 136, at 767 ("[Flor any given product some consumers will
overestimate the value of the product while others will underestimate the value of the product.
But the existence of both overestimators and underestimators does not mean that the average
estimate is unbiased; and neither does it mean that the average bias is sufficiently close to zero
that it can be safely ignored. It is an empirical question. The evidence suggests that, at least in
some cases, the average estimate is biased and consumers suffer from a systematic misperception
in an identified direction."). Professor Bar-Gill has documented, in a series of articles, substantial
evidence of persistent consumer misperceptions and strategic producer manipulation of those
misperceptions in the consumer credit industry. See generally id. at 775-80 (credit cards); Oren
Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic,98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373 (2004) (same); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law,
Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073 (2009)

(subprime mortgages).
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advertising claims (search goods: the truth of the claim can be
ascertained before purchase) through experience goods (where the
truth of the claim can be detected only after purchase and use)
through credence goods (where the validity of advertisements may
never be determined [because credence characteristics are defined as
those ascertainable only by experts, or only after an extended time, if
at all]). As we move along this continuum from search to credence
characteristics, misrepresentation becomes relatively more profitable,
since detection by consumers becomes more expensive . . .. [I]t is in

the case of credence characteristics that self-protection becomes
most difficult and in which some legal remedy would seem most
important. 212
This framework provides a useful tool to identify targets for
intervention against brand bias. In recent work, Professor J. Shahar
Dillbary has argued that consumer reliance on trademarks for
information about credence qualities can lead to the type of
opportunistic behavior by sellers discussed in the previous subpartthat trademarks can serve as false advertising. 2 13 While his insights are
important and valuable, because Dillbary works within the search-costs
tradition and accepts its descriptive assumptions about consumer
decision-making, he limits his inquiry to accurate consumer beliefs
about credence qualities that are rendered inaccurate by a producer that
changes its product but retains its brand name. 2 14 The research
reviewed in Part II above shows that Dillbary's inquiry is too narrow:
Brand bias is inherent in branding; it causes consumers to form
inferences about credence and experience qualities based on nothing but
familiarity. Moreover, it causes experience characteristics to behave
somewhat like credence characteristics. 215 Thus, in markets where
credence and experience characteristics dominate and marketing is
prevalent, we would expect brand bias to be playing a significant role
and generating incentives for opportunistic behavior by producers.
With these criteria in mind, two industries that we would predict to
be heavily influenced by brand bias (and thus to attract both intense
marketing efforts and the interest of regulators) are the food and drug
industries. Not only are these industries dominated by experience and
212 Jordan & Rubin, supra note 103, at 531. On the distinction between search, experience,
and credence characteristics, see generally Michael R. Darby & Edi Kami, Free Competition and
the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. L. & EcoN. 67 (1973); Phillip Nelson, Information and

Consumer Behavior, 78 J.POL. ECON. 311 (1970).
213 See generally J. Shahar Dillbary, Getting the Word Out: The Informational Function of

Trademarks, 4041 ARIz. ST. L.J. 991, 1023-29 (2009); Dillbary, supra note 138. Cf Darby &
Karni, supra note 212, at 68-71 (demonstrating the welfare losses from seller deception regarding
credence goods).
214 Dillbary, Getting the Word Out, supra note 213, at 1023-29; Dillbary, supra note 138, at

339-42.
215 See supra Part 1I.B. See generallySrinivasan & Till, supra note 116.
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credence characteristics, the magnitude of potential welfare losses to
consumers (and thus of potential rents to producers) resulting from
brand bias is quite high. It is therefore unsurprising that these product
categories are simultaneously overrun with consumer marketing 216
(such as the HeadOn example) and subject to some of the most
voluminous and diverse regulations of any consumer market.
Examination of these regulations thus illustrates how brand bias might
be exploited by strategic producers, how it might be addressed by nontrademark-based legal intervention, and how successful such efforts are
likely to be at maximizing aggregate social welfare.
2. Debiasing Through Law:
The Food and Drug Example
As discussed above, once divergences from rational behavior are
identified in a particular market, the decision to intervene in the market
with regulation should depend on both the extent to which strategic
actors are able to exploit such discrepancies in welfare-reducing ways
and the social costs of the contemplated legal intervention. 217 On the
first point, the history of food and drug markets leaves little question
that strategic actors can and do exploit brand bias through their
marketing and production tactics. By the turn of the twentieth century,
American industry had generated such a talent for debasing and
adulterating food products that it took the U.S. Department of
Agriculture several years and over 1500 pages to document the extent of

216 A U.S. Department of Agriculture study calculated total advertising expenditures in the
food and alcohol industries to be $11 billion in 1997-nearly 16% of all mass-media advertising
expenditures that year. Of this, $7 billion was spent by food manufacturers. Anthony E. Gallo,
Food Advertising in the United States, in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AMERICA'S EATING
HABITS: CHANGES AND CONSEQUENCES 173, 174-75 (1999). Recent proprietary reports reveal

those figures to be roughly the same as recently as 2009. Press Release, Kantar Media, Kantar
Media Reports U.S. Advertising Expenditures Declined 12.3 Percent in 2009 (Mar. 17, 2010),
at
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100317005458/en/Kantar-Mediaavailable
Reports-U.S.-Advertising-Expenditures-Declined.
In the pharmaceutical industry, a recent study estimated that the industry spent $57.5
billion on all marketing activities in 2004, more than it did on research and development-a claim
at odds with the industry trade group's public statements. Marc-Andr6 Gagnon & Joel Lexchin,
The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the

United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 31 (2008). Of this amount, approximately $4 billion represents
direct-to-consumer advertising expenditures, according to a widely cited media intelligence firm.
Id; accord Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade ofDirect-to-Consumer Advertising ofPrescription

Drugs, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 676 (2007) (reporting that the industry spent $4.237 billion
on direct-to consumer marketing of prescription drugs in 2005, an inflation-adjusted increase of
330% since a decade earlier).
217 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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the problem. 218 In the same period, the poor state of medical
knowledge contributed to the spread of quacks and hucksters hawking
ineffective or positively harmful patent medicines and snake-oil
cures. 219 Clearly some intervention was warranted, and progressive-era
legislation such as the Food and Drug Act of 1906220 targeted these
abuses, laying a foundation 221 on which successive generations have
built, both with novel strategies in manufacture and marketing and with
renewed efforts at intervention. 222
The next step in the analysis-evaluating the costs of legal
intervention-invites an examination of the wide variety of food and
drug regulations. These regulatory efforts can be broadly divided into
two categories: regulation of markets and regulation of marketing. By
regulation of markets, I mean to refer to interventions that purport to
limit the types of goods that may legally be brought to market. In the
food and drug context, these regulations may be of an ex ante varietyfor example, the requirement that a drug be approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) prior to being introduced commercially 223
or the compelled intermediation of experts, such as the state-licensed
medical profession. 224 Or regulations might be of an ex post varietyfor example, promulgating standards of identity for food productS225
and subjecting nonconforming producers to corrective remedies through
218 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, BUREAU OF CHEMISTRY, FOOD AND FOOD ADULTERANTS

(BULLETIN 13) (1897-1902). See generally C.C. Reiger, The Struggle for Federal Food and
Drugs Legislation, 1 J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1933) (documenting the process of exposition,
education, and mobilization that generated the Food and Drugs Act of 1906). Britain, the first
industrialized society, had generated a similar catalog some decades earlier. FREDRICK ACCUM,
A TREATISE ON ADULTERATIONS OF FOOD AND CULINARY POISONS (2d ed. 1820). In contrast to
the bureaucratic stoicism of Wiley's reports, the frontspiece of Accum's treatise is illustrated with
a shrouded human skull sitting atop an urn entwined with serpents; the urn is inscribed with the
scriptural quotation: "There is DEATH in the Pot." 2 Kings 4:40.
219 See generally SAMUEL HOPKINS ADAMS, THE GREAT AMERICAN FRAUD: ARTICLES ON
THE NOSTRUM EVIL AND QUACKERY, IN TWO SERIES, REPRINTED FROM COLLIER'S WEEKLY
(1907).
220 Federal Food & Drugs Act of 1906 (Wiley Act), Pub. L. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
221 Of course, the federal statute had been preceded by a number of similar efforts at the state
level. Reiger, supra note 218, at 5 ("By 1906 practically all the states had pure food laws.").
222 The struggle continues to the present day and will likely never cease. See, e.g., FTC v. QT,
Inc., 512 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding injunctive and disgorgement remedies granted to
the Commission against the manufacturer of the "Q-Ray Ionized Bracelet," marketed as a pain
remedy).
223 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
224 Intermediation need not be legally mandated to arise as a solution to the problem of brand
bias. In various industries, private entrepreneurs provide third-party certification services
regarding credence and experience qualities. Elise Golan et al., Economics of FoodLabeling, 24
J. CONSUMER POL'Y 117, 130-36 (2001). See generally Timothy J. Feddersen & Thomas W.
Gilligan, Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 149 (2001) (modeling activism to induce corporate responsibility as this type of
private credence-quality verification).
225 21 U.S.C. § 341; 21 C.F.R. Parts 130-169.
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public enforcement 226 or private tort regimes. 227 By regulation of
marketing, I refer to interventions that purport to control the flow of
information regarding products that are permitted in the marketplace.
Examples include compulsory labeling laws, 22 8 mandatory
disclaimers, 229 pre-market review of prescription drug trademarks, 230
false advertising law (including corrective advertising remedies), 23 1 and
ad hoc advertising restrictions or bans. 232 Again, enforcement may be
ex ante or expost,233 public or private. 234
226 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-337 (public enforcement regime, including civil, criminal, and forfeiture
penalties).
227 The extent to which the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act's public enforcement regime
preempts private state-law causes of action regarding regulated drugs is a subject of ongoing
debate and dispute. See generally, e.g., David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical
Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-WarnClaims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008);

see also Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal of a
putative New Jersey consumer fraud class action where dismissal was based on the argument that
FDA policy regarding the term "all natural" preempted the state-law claim); Von Koenig v.
Snapple Beverage Corp., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a
putative California consumer fraud class action on the same grounds).
228 See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (codified as amended in scattered sections of21 U.S.C.).
229 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 101.93 (source of the (in)famous "These statements have not been
evaluated by the FDA" disclaimer for dietary supplements).
230 FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONTENTS OF A COMPLETE SUBMISSION FOR THE
EVALUATION OF PROPRIETARY NAMES (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucm075068.pdf.
231 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (creating a private right of action against false or misleading
statements in advertising and promotion). See generally Richard S. Comfeld, A New Approach to
an Old Remedy: CorrectiveAdvertising and the Federal Trade Commission, 61 IOWA L. REV.

693 (1975) (discussing the history of the corrective advertising remedy and proposing its revival);
Letter from Thomas Abrams, Dir., Div. of Drug Mktg., Adver., & Commc'ns, FDA, to Reinhard
Franzen, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Oct. 3, 2008),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WamingLetters/2008/
at
available
ucml0481 10.htm (warning letter regarding allegedly misleading advertisements for Bayer's
branded contraceptive drug "Yaz," demanding corrective advertising under threat of enforcement
action).
232 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 353b (giving the administration the right to review television
advertisements for prescription drugs and to recommend-and in limited circumstances requirechanges prior to the advertisement being disseminated). Outright bans typically target products
or services that are believed to generate high social costs (i.e., vices) and as a result often invitebut survive-First Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Coyote Publ'g Inc. v. Miller, 598 F.3d 592
(9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to Nevada brothel advertising restrictions);
Educ. Media Co. v. Swecker, 602 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting First Amendment challenge
to Virginia restrictions on alcohol advertising to college students); Capital Broad. Co. v. Mitchell,
333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to electronic media
advertising ban provision of the federal Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969).
233 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 353b (allowing government intervention prior to dissemination of an
advertisement), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 1125(a)(1)(B) (providing remedies against alreadydisseminated false or misleading advertisements).
234 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (creating a private right of action against false or
misleading statements in advertising and promotion), with 15 U.S.C. § 45 (giving the Federal
Trade Commission authority to take action against "unfair or deceptive act[s] or practice[s]" in
commerce).
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Without undertaking a detailed exposition of the entire field of
food and drug law, we can use these examples to illustrate the costs and
benefits of legal intervention in a market where consumer knowledge is
derived largely from advertising by self-interested and potentially
strategic producers. Take, for example, mandatory disclosure regimes.
Such regimes are among the least controversial approaches to mitigating
cognitive bias, largely because of their relatively low social cost. 235 In
the food and drug context, perhaps the most successful such regime is
the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act (NLEA), which is
responsible for the standardized "Nutrition Facts" chart affixed to nearly
all branded food products sold at retail. 236 The available evidence
suggests that standardized nutritional information labeling has had a
salutary effect on consumer search costs and decision-making, and even
on the quality of products subject to the labeling regime. 237
However, the success of a mandatory disclosure regime in
ameliorating brand bias is not guaranteed; to the contrary, it depends
vitally on the design and content of the disclosures, on the mix of
information beyond the disclosures that is available to consumers, and
on the nature of the market itself.2 38 In the fast-food context, for
example, the effects of compulsory calorie disclosures on consumer
235 See Bar-Gill, supra note 136, at 793-802; Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Casefor "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA.

L. REV. 1211, 1230-37 (2003); Epstein, NeoclassicalEconomics, supra note 133, at 807 ("It is
possible to take some simple steps that will reduce the rate of error, such as requiring
standardized disclosures, without imposing heavy burdens on regulated parties.").
236 Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
237 See generally, e.g., Dillbary, Getting the Word Out, supra note 213, at 1011-13 (noting that

passage of the NLEA appears to have disproportionately burdened producers of unhealthier foods
who benefited from consumer misinformation prior to passage); Dubow & Childs, supra note 84,
at 149 ("[The FDA] believes its recently required new label format, which displays fat and
sodium levels in an easily compared manner, drove immense amounts of fat and sodium out of
products as companies surreptitiously reformulated to improve their label numbers.");
Jayachandran N. Variyam & John Cawley, Nutrition Labels & Obesity (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. Wl 1956, 2006) (finding that the NLEA's benefits in terms of
better informed consumer decision-making greatly outweigh the costs of its implementation).
238 See generally Jason M Szanyi, Brain Food: Bringing PsychologicalInsights to Bear on

Modern Nutrition Labeling Efforts, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 159 (2010) (discussing shortcomings
of various labeling regimes from a cognitive psychology perspective). Most recently, this feature
of disclosure regimes has been the subject of spirited debate between behavioralist and
neoclassical commentators on the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Compare generally Epstein,
NeoclassicalEconomics, supra note 133 (arguing that TILA is likely sufficient to ameliorate any
tractable errors in consumer cognition and that the costs of any more onerous regimes would
likely outweigh their benefits), with Bar-Gill, supra note 136 (arguing that TILAs disclosure
regime should be modified so as to be more comprehensive and standardized); Jeff Sovern,
Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in
Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761 (2010) (arguing that TILA's

poorly-designed disclosures fail to promote informed consumer decisions regarding mortgage
loans).
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decision-making are ambiguous at best. 239 For prescription drugs, the
evidence suggests that the effectiveness of mandatory disclosures in
conveying accurate information to consumers is highly sensitive to the
specific form and content of the disclosures, inviting strategic behavior
by sophisticated producers. 240 And in the dietary supplement market,
formulaic mandatory disclaimers in advertisements appear to entrench,
rather than dispel, erroneous consumer beliefs. 24 1 In short, the
effectiveness, to say nothing of the cost-effectiveness, of something so
seemingly straightforward as a mandatory disclosure regime is a
complex empirical question.
Moving beyond mere disclosure regimes to more complex
regulation of marketing, consider the regime addressing direct-toconsumer (DTC) advertising of prescription drugs. As the earlier
discussion explains (and as the HeadOn example illustrates), producers
need not make explicit claims to generate consumer beliefs favorable to
the producers' sales efforts; all they need is to expend resources to
familiarize consumers with their brand name. 242 In the early 2000s,
applicable law allowed prescription drug makers to omit information
about a drug's indications and side-effects in so-called "reminder
advertisements" while still referencing the drug's brand name (on the
assumption that consumers could and would get further information
elsewhere, such as from doctors or from product claims made in other
advertisements). 243 In this regulatory environment, drug makers not
only frequently deployed reminder advertising, but sometimes tried to
pair it with other forms of advertising that would provide indirect
239 Compare Mary T. Bassett et al., PurchasingBehavior and Calorie Information at Fast-

Food Chains in New York City, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1457 (2008) (finding that the presence of
calorie information on menus at Subway chain restaurants led consumers to purchase marginally
lower-calorie options), with Brian Elbel et al., CalorieLabelingAnd Food Choices: A FirstLook
At The Effects On Low-Income People In New York City, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS wI110 (2009),

available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/fuIll28/6/wl110 (finding that even though
some low-income customers of fast food restaurants said that new legally mandated calorie
disclosures influenced their decisions, their actual purchases were indistinguishable from
purchases by comparable consumers without calorie information).
240 See generally, e.g., Joel Davis, The Effect of Qualifying Language on Perceptions of Drug
Appeal, Drug Experience, and Estimates of Side-Effect Incidence in DTC Advertising, 12 J.

HEALTH COMM. 607 (2007).
241 Karen Russo France & Paula Fitzgerald Bone, Policy Makers' Paradigms and Evidence
from Consumer Interpretations of Dietary Supplement Labels, 39 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 27

(2005) (finding, based on an experimental study, that the FDA's disclosure regime for dietary
supplements does not lead to informed consumer behavior and in fact mainly serves to reinforce
pre-existing attitudes and beliefs in potentially misleading ways).
242 Supra notes 2-16 and accompanying text; Part II.B. 1.
243 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST
ADVERTISEMENTS (Aug. 1999, updated April 18, 2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/
Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/ucml25039.htm; see also 21 C.F.R. § 200.200 (defining
"reminder advertisements" exempt from the rigorous disclosure requirements for DTC
advertisements that include product claims).
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suggestions about the indications of the branded drug without disclosing
its risks. 244 Indeed, only when congressional attention raised the
possibility of even stricter controls on DTC advertising 245 did the
pharmaceutical industry collectively adopt voluntary restrictions on
reminder ads. 2 4 6 And even under these self-imposed restrictions,
producers continue to find subtle ways of ensuring that consumers
internalize favorable attribute claims while unfavorable attributes are
downplayed. 247 In sum, the history of DTC advertising demonstrates
the complex enforcement problems that can mitigate the effectiveness
and increase the cost of a regulatory regime that attempts to provide
more flexibility than standardized disclosure mandates.
Where more muscular interventions are felt to be needed,
intervention in markets might thus seem to be the more reliable option
for mitigating or avoiding the harms to consumers resulting from brand
bias. That is, even if it is hopeless to try to regulate strategic marketing
efforts by producers, the bias-prone consumer cannot be injured by the
disparity between expected and actual product performance if there is
no product to buy. The only consumer injury under such a regime
would be in the form of opportunity costs arising from the absence of
excluded products from the market.248
Moreover, conspicuous
intervention in a market can have secondary effects similar to
intervention in marketing-for example, the fact that a drug has
244 See generally Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of Direct-toConsumer PrescriptionDrug Advertising Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 423, 430-41 (2002)
(noting that the FDA had begun stepping up enforcement against such circumvention of
disclosure requirements); Tamar V. Terzian, Note, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug
Advertising, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 149 (1999); Letter from Joan Henkin, Consumer Prot. Analyst,
FDA, to Mary Jane Nehring, Dir., Worldwide Regulatory Affairs, Schering Corp. (Aug. 18,
2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharma
ceuticalCompanies/UCMI66052.pdf (FDA warning letter regarding Schering-Plough's
particularly transparent use of such a tactic in print advertising for allergy drug Claritin).
245 See, e.g., Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Drug Industry Creates Voluntary Ad Guidelines, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at D4 ("Responding to increased criticism from Congress, the pharmaceutical
industry announced a set of voluntary guidelines ... [that] call on companies to eliminate
'reminder' ads that typically carry little discussion of the risks and benefits of products.").
246 PHRMA GUIDING PRINCIPLES: DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISEMENTS ABOUT
PRESCRIPTION MEDICINES, Principle No. 10 (Nov. 2005).

247 Ziad F. Gellad & Kenneth W. Lyles, Direct-to-ConsumerAdvertising of Pharmaceuticals,

120 AM. J. MED. 475, 477 (2007) ("[M]ost broadcast advertisements give consumers more time
to absorb facts about benefits than those about risks, and risks are presented at a higher grade
level (9th grade) as compared with benefits (6th grade). Similarly, an analysis of prescription
drug websites found that the homepage often disproportionately emphasizes benefits at the
expense of risks." (footnote omitted)).
248 One libertarian think tank has made it a priority to draw attention to these opportunity
costs, arguing that they are insufficiently accounted for in current policy. Daniel B. Klein &
Alexander
Tabarrok,
FDAREVIEW.ORG,
A
PROJECT OF
THE
INDEP.
INST.,

http://www.fdareview.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
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survived FDA scrutiny may provide consumers with useful information
regarding the drug's credence characteristics. 249
Of course, this purported effectiveness of market intervention
comes at a steep price. Regulation of markets is orders of magnitude
more costly than regulation of marketing-to the taxpayer, to the target
of regulation, and (to the extent pass-through is possible) to consumers
of the regulatory targets' products-and ex ante regulation (which holds
out the hope of preventing harm to consumers before it occurs) is more
costly than ex post regulation.250 Perhaps more troublingly, all this
expense does not guarantee that consumers will be protected from the
harms that flow from brand bias. Adequate consumer protection
requires effective administration and enforcement of market
interventions. 251 Of course, total administrative effectiveness is more of
a utopian aspiration than a realistic standard. Recent withdrawals of
249 Oliver Bonroy & Christos Constantatos, On the Use ofLabels in Credence Goods Markets,

33 J. REGUL. ECON. 237, 248 n.26 (2008) ("[FDA's] alleged tendency of not approving a new
drug until being certain about its effects ... has the advantage of creating a sort of credible label:
once a new drug is approved, consumers must be certain that it represents a superior product,
even with respect to any long term health effects.").
250 A widely cited study estimated the fully capitalized cost of bringing a single new drug to
market through the FDA approval process at $802 million. See generally Joseph A. DiMasi et al.,
The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151

(2003). This is nearly the total amount in user fees the FDA expected to collect in Fiscal Year
2010-a year for which the agency's entire budget request was $3.25 billion. U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY OF THE FDA'S FY 2010 BUDGET, available at http://www.fda.gov/

AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/ucml53154.htm. However, it should
be noted that some commentators treat the $802 million figure with some skepticism. Indeed,
one recent critique suggests that the figure may be inflated by as much as a factor of 20. See
Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical
Research, BIOSOCIETIES ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.palgrave-

journals.com/biosoc/jouma/vaop/ncurrent/pdf/biosoc201040a.pdf.
By contrast, the total
estimated cost to the entire food industry of complying with the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act was $2.3 billion, and the estimated cost to the government of implementing it only $163
million. Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Rules to Amend the Food Labeling
Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 2927, 2935 (Jan. 6, 1993).
251 Of course, the effectiveness of enforcement is a key qualification: intermediators such as
government agencies and professional experts may lack competence or they may have conflicts of
interest that prevent them from acting in consumers' best interests. On the competence issue, see,
for example, Jeanne Lenzer, FDA Is Incapable ofProtecting US "Against Another Vioxx," 329

BRITISH MED. J. 1253, 1253 (2004) (discussing accusations that the approval of Vioxx
represented a failure of regulatory design and execution at FDA); and Barbara Mintzes et al., How
Does Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) Affect Prescribing?A Survey in Primary Care
Environments with and Without Legal DTCA, 169 J. DE L'ASSOCIATION MDICALE CANADIENNE

405, 412 (2003) (finding that DTCA makes physicians more likely to prescribe drugs about
which they are ambivalent). On the conflict-of-interest issue, see generally, for example, Thomas
Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 342

NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539-43 (2000) (discussing potential conflicts of interest created by
pharmaceutical industry funding of FDA clinical trials); and Ashley Wazana, Physiciansand the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 373-80 (2000)

(documenting the influence of the pharmaceutical industry over physicians' prescription practices
and other professional behavior).
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highly advertised drugs such as Vioxx 252 -whose fatal side effects
failed to spur FDA action in either premarket or postmarket reviewmake this abundantly clear. Moreover, for so long as such regulatory
failure goes undiscovered, the secondary effects of intervention in
markets (i.e., its tendency to lead consumers to view approved products
more favorably) may perversely increase the injuries resulting from
brand bias. In short, intervention in markets is beset with the same
problems as intervention in marketing, with the distinction that the
stakes are far, far higher.
As this subpart illustrates, industry-specific legal intervention to
ameliorate brand bias, attractive as it might seem, must be scrutinized
closely. To be sure, it is an affront to efficiency and to consumer
autonomy for producers to deceptively market their wares to consumers,
even if the deception consists merely in taking advantage of brand bias.
But attempting to stamp out strategic producer behavior through
regulation merely adds a new set of tradeoffs-between the costs (to
industry, consumers, and government) and benefits (to consumers and
honest producers) of government intervention-to the tradeoff between
the costs (brand bias) and benefits (lowered search costs) of trademark
protection. Once again, determining whether a particular intervention,
on balance, will increase or decrease aggregate social welfare, even if
we assume no changes to the trademark regime, is an intensely
empirical question.
C. From Efficiency to Distribution:
The Descriptive and the Normative

At this point, we reach the limits of theory. Elegant as it is, the
search-costs model is helpless to tell us whether trademark protection in
a given industry promotes economic efficiency, because it fails to
account for brand bias. For this reason, the model is similarly helpless
to determine whether brand bias in a particular market is significant
enough to warrant government intervention, let alone what type of
interventions will tend toward maximum efficiency. Making these
determinations requires empirical study that is sensitive to the nature of
consumer cognition and the idiosyncrasies of particular markets.

252 See generally Richard Horton, Vioxx, the Implosion of Merck, and Aftershocks at the FDA,
364 LANCET 1995 (2004). See also Ronald M. Green, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and
Pharmaceutical Ethics: The Case of Vioxx, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 749, 752 (2006) ("In 2000,

Merck spent $160.8 million on DTC advertising, the largest amount spent on DTC for any drug
that year....").
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"The problem, of course, is that in many cases policymakers have
little information with which to perform a meaningful cost-benefit
analysis." 253 In food and drug markets, the empirical debate has been
joined, as it has in the consumer finance markets, 254 but other consumer
markets fail to attract such rigorous, industry-specific empirical
research. Where we nevertheless make assertions about the efficiency
of such markets, we are likely guilty of confusing the descriptive with
the normative. Absent sufficient empirical grounding, any argument
that branding in a particular consumer market makes society better off,
or that government intervention in a consumer market where branding is
prevalent makes society worse off, cannot be understood as an argument
about efficiency. Rather, any such argument based on theory alone
merely uses the language of efficiency to mask an underlying argument
about distribution: an irreducibly normative claim as to which segment
of society should bear the transactions costs inherent in consumer
markets. 255 As the food and drug example demonstrates, we might go
to great lengths to ensure that the transactions costs of consumer
markets do not manifest themselves in the form of mothers
unknowingly poisoning their infant children with the latest branded
patent medicine, 256 and yet tolerate imposition of considerable costs on
credulous consumers of heavily marketed homeopathic cures for the
common cold. 257 How much more might we be willing to burden
borrowers who failed to read their loan documents, 258 to say nothing of

253 Bar-Gill, supra note 136, at 793.

254 See supra note 238 and sources cited therein.
255 Cf generally Beebe, supra note 25 (noting that arguments concerning consumer
competencies in the face of branding are deployed inconsistently by courts, commentators, and
litigants in order to advance their substantive agenda regarding the scope of trademark law).
256 See, e.g., John S. Haller, Jr., Opium Usage in Nineteenth Century Therapeutics, 65 BULL.
N.Y. AcAD. MED. 591, 600 (1989) (discussing the popular children's remedy "Mrs. Winslow's
Soothing Syrup," a clandestine opiate regularly administered to infants, with ghastly results); see
also BEE WILSON, SWINDLED: THE DARK HISTORY OF FOOD FRAUD, FROM POISONED CANDY
TO COUNTERFEIT COFFEE 154-63 (2008) (discussing New York City's "swill milk scandal" of

the mid-nineteenth century, in which the premature deaths of thousands of infants was attributed
to adulterated milk); Peter Temin, Government Actions in Times of Crisis: Lessons from the
History of Drug Regulation, 18 J. Soc. HIST. 433, 436-37 (1985) (discussing how the birth of
babies without hands or feet as a result of exposure to the unapproved drug thalidomide spurred
strengthening of the FDA's regulatory authority).
257 Compare U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE § 400.400, Conditions
Under Which Homeopathic Drugs May Be Marketed (May 31, 1988, revised March 1995),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicyGuidanceManual/
ucm074360.htm (outlining broadly permissive policy with respect to marketing of homeopathic
remedies), with Letter from Deborah M. Autor to William J. Hemelt (June 16, 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucml66909.htm (threatening the
manufacturer of the branded homeopathic cold remedy Zican with enforcement action after
receiving 130 reports that the product caused anosmia).
258 See supra note 238 and sources cited therein.

2011]

BIASING BRANDS

1313

ordinary shoppers at the grocery store and the pharmacy who base their
purchase decisions on the latest ad campaign?
Drawing distinctions between these markets, determining whether
any of them require legal intervention to guard against brand bias, and
determining what, if any, legal intervention can provide a benefit to
consumers that outweighs its costs to society, are not tasks the searchcosts model is even interested in, let alone equipped to perform. In its
incompleteness, the search-costs model reflects little more than a
normative commitment to the proposition that producers should be free
to allocate transactions costs in consumer markets as they see fit, to the
extent that they are able. Of course, reflexive resort to intrusive
consumer protection regimes suffers from the inverse problem: It
assumes that all transactions costs in consumer markets should be
allocated by the government, preferably to be imposed on producers
(with or without the recognition that producers are likely to pass such
costs through to their customers or manipulate them to erect barriers to
competitive entry). Either of these categorical positions may reflect
ideological or intuitive beliefs regarding the parties best able to allocate
or bear transactions costs, but absent empirical support neither of them
can guide us to efficiency in our consumer markets.
This leaves us with a choice: We can admit that much of our
thinking about the appropriate scope of trademark law and consumer
protection law is normative-that is, distributional and ultimately
political-in nature, or we can use the empirical evidence available to
us-and develop further evidence as needed-to escape such normative
debates and inform the quest for efficiency in consumer markets. To
the extent we can agree on the normative appeal of efficiency even if we
disagree about distribution, the latter course would seem to be
preferable. The brand equity literature reviewed in Part I of this Article
provides an imperfect beginning to this endeavor, while the related
empirical research reviewed in Part II of this Article provides guidance
for continuing it in the future. Moving forward, it will be important to
keep in mind the complementary relationship between trademark law
and consumer protection law described in this Part and to view these
two bodies of law as partners rather than competitors in the project of
improving our consumer markets.
CONCLUSION

The goal of this Article has been to question the broad acceptance
of the search-costs model of trademark protection and its conclusion
that such protection increases aggregate social welfare. The lens for
this inquiry has been the concept of brand equity: the incremental value
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that a brand imparts to a product and the mechanisms by which it does
so. Research in marketing, psychology, and economics suggests that
the model's categorical conclusion is unsound, but that it may be
tenable in certain factual contexts where informational and persuasive
content of trademarks dominates. In other contexts, however, the
psychological effects of trademarks may give rise to a divergence
between objective evidence and subjective consumer beliefs and
preferences-a phenomenon I have labeled brand bias. In such
situations, strategic behavior by sellers can generate welfare losses,
which may overwhelm trademark protection's positive welfare effects.
Distinguishing between trademark uses that present a net increase
versus a net decrease in social welfare is a complex empirical task, in
which at least three sources of transactions costs-search costs, brand
bias, and the costs of government intervention-must be weighed and
balanced on an industry-by-industry basis. While trademark doctrine
lacks the tools to effectively strike this balance, complementary bodies
of law appear to be directed at minimizing the potential for
opportunistic deployment of brand bias by producers while lowering, or
at least not raising, consumer search costs. This Article discussed and
critiqued various approaches to such complementary regulation in the
context of food and drug law, a potent example where marketing,
regulation, and empirical research on both are widespread. In other
industries, however, empirical evidence may be insufficiently developed
to allow for an effective balancing of costs and benefits.
The lesson of this Article is that such a dearth of empirical
evidence undermines the efficiency-based arguments of the search-costs
model, reducing them to normative arguments about the appropriate
distribution of transactions costs.
With a more sophisticated
understanding of consumer cognition and behavior and corresponding
refinements to the search-costs model, we might avoid normative
impasses generated by such modes of argumentation and instead engage
in empirically-informed debate over the appropriate scope of trademark
and consumer protection law at the industry level. Such debate holds
the greatest promise of moving us toward the efficiency that the searchcosts model promises but currently lacks the tools to deliver.

